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Tort Liability for Nondisclosure: The
Physician's Legal Obligations to Disclose
Patient Illness and Injury
Theodore R. LeBlang*
Jane L. King**
I. Introduction
The relationship between a doctor and his patient creates a duty
in the physician to disclose to his patient any material information concerning the patient's physical condition. This duty to inform stems from the fiduciary nature of the relationship and the
patient's right to determine what shall or shall not be done with
his body.'
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1. Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980). The requirement of open communication between physician and patient was recognized early in this century in Logan v.
Field, 192 Mo. 54, 90 S.W. 127 (1905), in which the following jury instructions were given by
the trial court:
The plaintiff, in accepting defendant as a patient . . . in effect said to defendant
that he possessed and would exercise reasonable skill and judgment to discover
the trouble and whether it was curable, and that if a cure was doubtful he would
inform the defendant of such doubt and not conceal the same from the defendant. If at . . . any time during the plaintiff's service, the plaintiff was conscious
of his inability to understand or properly treat the defendant's trouble, it was his
duty to . . . fully inform the defendant thereof; concealment . . . of any ignorance of defendant's case. . . would be a fraud, and for which service no compensation could be recovered.
Id. at 57, 90 S.W. at 129.

This common law pronouncement reflects a growing trend in the
law toward greater recognition of a physician's fiduciary obligation
to fully disclose to a patient information regarding the condition of
the patient's body. The obligation to disclose encompasses communication ranging from the nature and scope of human illness to the

extent and cause of negligently induced injury. Expansion of the
physician's duty to disclose is premised upon the right of self-determination, defined as the right of an individual patient to exercise
control over his or her own body. Principles of autonomy and selfdetermination have become central themes in cases dealing with in-

formation disclosure by physicians. As a result, courts have required
physicians to disclose full and complete information to patients regarding their medical condition. Physicians who breach this disclosure obligation can be held liable on such legal theories as fraud,2
deceit,- misrepresentation, 4 and conspiracy,5 as well as negligence.

State legislatures also have demonstrated their concern over the
problem of insufficient disclosure. Many legislatures have complemented the common law trend toward full and complete disclosure
by enacting statutes mandating specific, detailed disclosures to pa-

tients. 6 Furthermore, a significant amount of recent medical litera2. See infra notes 139-160 and accompanying text.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See infra notes 156-170 and accompanying text.
6. The origins of these statutory disclosure requirements may be traced to the Bill of
Rights promulgated by the American Hospital Association (AHA) in 1973. The Bill of Rights
emphasized a need for patient autonomy-for patient control over medical treatment. See G.
ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF HOSPITAL PATIENTS 25-31 (1975). See also A Bill of Rights for

Patients: Diagnosis, IIB

HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL

(1974).

The AHA Bill of Rights granted, inter alia, the right to current and complete information
about diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis; the right to know medically significant risks and
alternatives; the right to informed consent; the right to refuse treatment; the right to privacy
and confidentiality; the right to reasonable continuity of care; and the right to know if the
patient were to be involved in research or experimentation.
Similarly, in 1974, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare adopted a Bill of
Rights for residents in skilled nursing facilities participating in Medicare and Medicaid. 39
Fed. Reg. 35,774-5 (1974). A more comprehensive Model Patient's Bill of Rights was included
in an American Civil Liberties Union publication in 1975. G. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF HoSiTAL PATIENTS 233-35 (1975). Currently, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals
provides for patient rights. ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS vii (1984).
Numerous states statutorily recognize a Patient Bill of Rights. The Minnesota legislation,
the first to be enacted, was patterned after the AHA's Bill of Rights. The Minnesota law
provides in part:
Every patient . . . can reasonably expect to obtain from his physician . . . complete and current information concerninghis diagnosis, treatment and prognosis
in terms and language the patient can reasonably be expected to understand. In
cases in which it is not medically advisable to give information to the patient
. . . the information may be made available to the appropriate person in his
behalf....
MINN. STAT. ANN.

§144.651 (West Supp. 1983) (emphasis added).

Most jurisdictions also statutorily assure access to medical records. Medical Records, IIA
HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL 20 (1983). Moreover, legislation addressing either the substantive or
procedural aspects of informed consent is in effect in at least 23 states. Andrews, Informed

ture has addressed the issue of disclosure to patients, not only indicating a professional awareness of the public's desire for more
information about and control over their medical care, but also urging a professional standard that contemplates complete disclosure.
The scope of the legal trend toward full communication between
physician and patient extends beyond the traditional doctrine of informed consent. 7 Recent judicial decisions require that complete inConsent Statutes and the Decisionmaking Process, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 163 (1984).
Texas has an interesting system that closely controls the disclosure obligation of physicians. Under the pertinent statute, TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (Vernon 1982-83),
there exists a Texas Medical Disclosure Panel which endeavors to establish minimum levels of
disclosure. If physicians follow these standards, then a signed consent form serves as evidence
that the physician has discharged the duty to inform the patient. See Texas Panel Amends
Lists of Procedures Requiring Disclosure, TEx. MED., Jan. 1983, at 32. See also Curran,
Informed Consent, Texas Style: Disclosureand Nondisclosureby Regulation, 300 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 482 (1979); Richards and Rathbun, A ProcrusteanApproach to Informed Consent:
The Texas Medical Disclosure Panel, 10 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 158 (Sept. 1982).
A regulatory scheme may also articulate a duty to disclose. See, e.g., Betesh v. United
States, 400 F. Supp. 238, 243 (D.D.C. 1974), which concerned, inter alia, violation of Army
Regulation 601-270, Para. 64f, Change 5, Sept. 12, 1962, which stated:
Rejected examinees in need of medical attention.Applicants for enlistment and
registrants who are considered to be medically unfit for military service and who
have been determined to have a condition requiring medical attention will be
advised by the medical examiner to seek advice from a physician. An entry will
be made in item 75, Standard Form 88, reflecting the fact that notification was
made.
400 F. Supp. at 243 (quoting Army Regulation 601-270).
7. One court has accurately described the informed consent doctrine as follows:
[Tihe doctrine (of informed consent] stands for the proposition that before any
medical procedure involving inherent risks of collateral injury is performed, the
doctor has a duty to apprise the patient of both the risks of, and the alternatives
to, the proposed procedure. The patient should then be allowed to weigh the
risks according to his own values, and choose the procedure he finds most acceptable, or to elect none at all.
Lambert v. Park, 597 F.2d 236, 237 n.1 (10th Cir. 1979). For landmark decisions in this area,
see Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229, 502
P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972), Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960);
Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977). For an overview of informed consent
legislation and judicial pronouncements in the various states, see Andrews, supra note 6. See
also Defending Physicians and Hospitals: A Look at Some New Problems, 1981 DEFENSE
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, No. 4 at 53 app. A & B; A.J. Rosoi', INFORMED CONSENT: A GUIDE
FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS app. 3-A (1981) [hereinafter cited as A.J. Rosofn]; and, Consent to Medical and Surgical Procedures,II HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL (1981).
Recent literature indicates the increasingly broad scope of informed consent, necessarily
including a greater degree of physician disclosure. See S.F. FISCINA, MEDICAL LAW FOR THE
ATrENDING PHYSICIAN ch.

4 (1982); 1 PRESIDENT'S

COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL

PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH
CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE

(1982); A.J. ROSOFF, supra; Berg & Hirsh, Duty to
Divulge: Physician as an "Honest Broker," LEGAL ASp. MED. PRAC., Sept. 1982, at I (the
cases reviewed suggest a nation-wide trend toward innovative and imaginative theories of liability. They include the "duty to recall, duty to obtain 'informed refusal,' and the duty to third
parties, some of whom may be total strangers."); Miller & Butler, Legal Aspects of PhysicianPatient Communication, 15 J. FAM. PRAC. 1131 (1982). A similar expansion is apparently
taking place in Canada. See Brown, Supreme Court Judgment: Courts May Now Enforce
Stricter Standardsof Disclosure on Doctors, 123 CAN. MED. A.J. 1167 (1980); M.A. SOMERPATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP

VILLE, CONSENT TO MEDICAL CARE (1979).

Experimentation is specifically covered by the informed consent doctrine. Due to severe
abuses concerning the failure to adequately inform subjects of experimentation, this area has

formation be provided to a patient regarding the nature and extent
of any adverse physical condition. 8 Moreover, courts have recognized
that because injury or illness may be difficult to diagnose without
appropriate tests, a physician must inform a patient of available diagnostic procedures and laboratory tests that may reveal an adverse
condition, as well as test results.9 This is especially true in the prenatal context since physician failure to adequately advise and test for
potential birth defects has resulted in a plethora of wrongful birth
and wrongful life cases.
Furthermore, although a physician is required by common law
to instruct a patient as to post-treatment care,' 0 it now appears that
the physician's responsibilities include the ongoing acquisition of
knowledge and information on the untoward effects of an earlier
course of treatment. 1 Judicial decisions indicate that a physician has
a responsibility to communicate these subsequent findings to a
patient. 12
In addition, courts are finding physicians liable for failing to
disclose information to their patients even in the absence of a specific
physician-patient relationship. 8 For example, in cases concerning
physicians hired by third parties, courts consistently have found a
duty to disclose to the patient even though the patient neither sought
the physician's services nor paid for them."
It has also become evident that a physician must disclose negligently induced injury to a patient.' This enables a patient to seek
treatment necessary to correct or remedy the damage caused by such
injury. As courts continue to acknowledge both the disclosure obligations of physicians and the rights of patients to full information in
choosing the course of medical treatment, the responsibility to disclose iatrogenic injury and physician error becomes increasingly significant. Courts have even gone so far as to allow third parties to
been subjected to intense public and governmental scrutiny in recent years. See McClellan,
Informed Consent to Medical Therapy and Experimentation, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 81 (1982).
For further discussion of this topic, see Research Ethics and Deception, LANCET, Apr. 5, 1980,
at 772; Freireich, Should the Patient Know?, 241 J.A.M.A. 928 (1979); Hagman, The Medical Patient's Right to Know: Report on a Medical-Legal-Ethical Empirical Study, 17
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 758 (1970); Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. pt.46 (1983)
(§46.116 provides the general requirements for informed consent, including: (1) description of
the research and the subject's participation therein; (2) description of the risks or discomforts;
(3) indication of any benefits to the subject; (4) explanation of alternative procedures or
courses of treatment; and (5) statement of voluntary nature of participation). See also Children Involved as Subjects in Research; Additional Protections, 45 C.F.R. §46.401-09 (1983).
8. See infra notes 19-35 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 36-96 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 97-121 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 114-121 and accompanying text.
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 122-137 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 125-137 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 138-162 and accompanying text.

maintain actions against physicians who cover up medical
negligence."
This article examines the nature and scope of the physician's
disclosure obligations in the physician-patient relationship, and limitations on the duty to disclose,1" emphasizing the doctor's expanding
responsibility to share information regarding illness and injury. 8
The article focuses primarily on analyzing pertinent common law decisions, with a view toward projecting likely future trends.
II.

Duty to Disclose Disease or Illness

In recent years, the physician's obligation to disclose disease or
illness within a patient's body has been significantly expanded.
Whether this trend is viewed as an expansion of the informed consent doctrine or as a more generic aspect of a physician's fiduciary
disclosure obligations, it reflects an emphasis upon personal rights
that are intended to vest in an individual ultimate control over his or
her destiny. As applied to the physician-patient relationship, the patient must be given full opportunity to direct the course of medical
care. As one commentator has noted, there has been in recent times
a tremendous rise in public consciousness concerning patients'
rights. Whereas people previously had been willing to rely heavily upon the skill and judgment of their physicians, it is much

more common now for patients to seek active involvement in the
decision-making processes affecting their care. The aura of infallibility that surrounded physicians and other health professionals

in the past has diminished, and laymen seem unwilling to accept
the decisions made by others on faith.19
16.

See infra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.

17. See infra notes 163-182 and accompanying text.
18. Physician disclosure obligations in contexts that are not the direct focus of this
article have grown significantly. In Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 457 A.2d 431 (1983), for
example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed the issue of "ghost surgery," i.e., performance of an operation by a physician other than the one named in the consent form. The
court noted that "[tlhe medical profession itself recognizes that it is unethical to mislead a
patient as to the identity of the doctor who performs the operation." Id. at 463, 457 A.2d at
439 (citing AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS, STATEMENTS ON PRINCIPLES, I.A. (June
1981)). The case concerned the practice of a urology medical group to share patients, resulting
in the plaintiff's being operated on by a member of the group different from the physician to
whom the patient granted consent to operate. The court emphasized that a patient has a right
to know who will operate, and substitution of one surgeon for another without the consent of
the patient is a deceit. 92 N.J. at 463-64, 457 A.2d at 440 (citing Judicial Council of the
American Medical Association, Op. 8.12 (1982)). Observing that the fiduciary relationship
between physician and patient creates a duty to disclose, the court opined that "a moral, imperative compels doctors to be honest with their patients." 92 N.J. at 463, 457 A.2d at 440.
See also Questions and Answers, 209 J.A.M.A. 947 (1969), which describes the performance

of surgery by a house officer operating under the supervision of a surgeon, but without patient
consent, as a fraud and deceit. See also Guebard v. Jabaay, 117 Ill. App. 3d 1, 452 N.E.2d
751 (1983) (first year resident "performed" surgery instead of "assisting" attending physician,
legitimizing cause of action for battery).
19. A.J. ROSOFF, supra note 7, at 1.

Central to the right to decide the course of one's medical care is
access to complete information regarding the condition of one's body.
This includes accurate communication of test results as well as information about the existence and value of tests that will provide more
reliable and detailed information about a patient's condition.
The evolving responsibility of the medical profession toward
complete disclosure also has tremendous implications for the physician's duty to disclose terminal illness to a patient. At no time is the
right to full disclosure more important than when death is imminent.
Accordingly, and consistent with common law principles of individual autonomy and self-determination, full disclosure of a fatal illness
such as cancer is required in order that the individual be able to
make final life and death decisions.
A.

Duty to Disclose Condition in Patient's Body

Recent cases have described the scope of a physician's duty to
disclose a condition in a patient's body and have set forth the parameters of that duty. The courts have uniformly held that a duty to
disclose is premised upon the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship. A physician occupies a position of trust which has
traditionally exacted responsibilities beyond those associated with
arm's-length transactions. A patient thus reposes special confidence
in the physician, relying upon the physician for information regarding his or her medical condition.
Acquisition of such information also ensures individual autonomy and the right to exercise control over one's own body.' Here,
courts focus on bodily integrity and respect for independence of
choice. Disclosure of information by the physician is critical to the
exercise of independent judgment by the patient and is an essential
adjunct to the patient's right of self-determination.
In Gates v. Jensen,' the Supreme Court of the State of Washington recognized the fiduciary relationship and individual autonomy
rationales for a broad-based duty to disclose, stating that "[the] physician has a fiduciary duty to inform a patient of abnormalities in his
or her body."" In Gates, the defendant physicians failed to inform a
patient that high pressure found in both of her eyes put her in a
borderline glaucoma risk classification. They also failed to inform
her that the risk of glaucoma was increased considerably by this
20. A classic statement of this right was enunciated by Judge Cardozo in 1914: "Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body .
Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914).
21. 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979).
22. Id. at 250, 595 P.2d at 922.

high pressure and by her myopia. The patient contended that the
physicians had a duty to disclose such facts so that she could make
an informed choice about treatments she would undergo. She further
asserted that if she had been informed of these facts she would have
requested additional tests and her glaucoma would therefore have
been discovered. Evidence at trial demonstrated that if glaucoma
had been detected when the patient first visited the clinic, the condition could have been stabilized and a great part of her vision saved.
At the time of trial the patient was functionally blind.
The court agreed that the doctors had a duty to disclose and
indicated that such a duty derives from one's right to know material
facts concerning the condition of one's body.3 As to the scope of this
disclosure responsibility, the court stated:
The patient's right to know is not confined to the choice of treatment once a disease is present and has been conclusively diagnosed. Important decisions must frequently be made in many
non-treatment situations in which medical care is given, including procedures leading to a diagnosis. . . . These decisions must
all be taken with the full knowledge and participation of the
patient. The physician's duty is to tell the patient what he or she
needs to know in order to make them. The existence of an abnormal condition in one's body, the presence of a high risk of
disease, and the existence of alternative diagnostic procedures to
conclusively determine the presence or absence of that disease
are all facts which a patient must know in order to make an
informed decision on the course which future medical care will
take. 4
In another recent case defining the scope of disclosure required
between physicians and their patients, the California Court of Appeals in Jamison v. Lindsay2 5 observed that a patient is entitled to
know all relevant information about the condition of his or her body
necessary to reasonably decide whether to pursue a potentially important course of treatment. In Jamison, a female had a large cystic
mass removed from her right ovary. The pathologist reported the
mass to be benign despite his awareness that it was a teratoma con23.

Id.

24. Id. at 250-51, 595 P.2d at 922-23. The Gates court did not view this disclosure
obligation as a new duty but rather viewed it as a part of the applicable scope of the doctrine
of informed consent. Id. at 251, 595 P.2d at 923. This represents one method in which the
duty of disclosure may be expanded without, on the surface, creating new law. In applying the
Gates enunciation of the doctrine of informed consent, the Washington Supreme Court in
Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 95 Wash. 2d 306, 622 P.2d 1246 (1979), stated, "From these
beginnings, the doctrine of informed consent has developed into a judicial affirmation of the
individual's right to ultimately control what happens to his body." 95 Wash. 2d at 313-14, 622
P.2d at 1252.
25. 108 Cal. App. 3d 223, 228-30, 166 Cal. Rptr. 443, 446-47 (1980).

taining both mature and immature tissue. The pathologist did not
agree with opinions in the field that held that such immature tissue
had potential for malignancy, and chose not to disclose the potential
for malignancy to the patient or her attending physician. Three
months later the patient was diagnosed with a cancerous retroperitoneal tumor. Although the case was decided on other grounds, the
court observed that the pathologist had a duty to disclose to the patient all relevant information regarding her physical condition, specifically including the data regarding potential malignancy of the
teratoma.2a
This expansive construction of the duty to disclose a patient's
medical condition was also enunciated in Nardone v. Reynolds.2" In
that case, a thirteen year old boy experiencing difficulty with coordination, blurred vision, dyplopia and headaches underwent four brain
operations and various diagnostic procedures, including insertion of a
ventriculoatrial shunt into his brain. Following this operation, the
patient's condition improved. Physicians then performed a
pantopaque ventriculogram, wherein dye is introduced into the ventricles of the brain. Some of the pantopaque entered the shunt tube
which rendered the tube nonfunctional. Thereafter, the child's condition worsened. Upon discharge from the hospital, the boy was comatose, totally blind and had suffered irreversible brain damage. Several treating physicians had failed to disclose to the patient or his
parents that a pantopaque ventriculogram had been performed, and
that it was the possible cause of his deterioration. In describing the
scope of the duty to disclose, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that "where an adverse condition is known to the doctor
or readily available to him through efficient diagnosis, he has a duty
to disclose and failure to do so amounts to a fraudulent withholding

of facts. .

"28

The decision in Nardone, as in Gates, based the physician's
duty to disclose on the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship: "'[Tlhe fiduciary, confidential relationship of physician-patient [imposes] on the physician a duty to disclose . . . known facts.
' "29 The Nardone court also found that this
duty does not expire
26. Id. at 230, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
27. 238 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1976).
28. Id. at 1135 (quoting Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25, 39 (Fla. 1976)). See also
Estate of Leach v. Shapiro (No. 11238, Ohio App., May 2, 1984) (holding that when the
physician has knowledge of a material fact concerning the patient's condition, failure to disclose may give rise to an action in fraud).
29. Id. The duty to disclose known facts regarding a patient's medical condition is vividly portrayed in Martisek v. Ainsworth, 459 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). In that case,
a malpractice action was premised upon a physician's failure to inform his patient of the extent of injuries received in an accident coupled with a failure to advise the patient of physical
limitations resulting from the injury. Although the patient had sustained compression fractures
of two vertebrae, his attending physician failed to prescribe treatment for the injuries and

when the physician-patient relationship ends,80 nor does it require as
a prerequisite that there be a direct relationship between physician
and patient. The duty to disclose depends in part on the nature of
the relationship and in part on the physician's knowledge of the patient's condition. 3'
In Davis v. Weiskopf, 2 the plaintiff appealed from a trial court
decision dismissing the action as to one of the defendants, Dr. Norman Hagman, on the basis that there existed no physician-patient
relationship. The plaintiff alleged that after seeing defendant Weiskopf for treatment, he was diagnosed as having a giant cell lesion in
the knee, suspicious of a primary bone neoplasm of malignant origin.
Without informing the patient of this condition, Dr. Weiskopf consulted with Dr. Hagman regarding the patient's condition and referred the plaintiff to him. Dr. Hagman rescheduled the plaintiff's
initial appointment without seeing him, and when the plaintiff telephoned prior to a second appointment to inform the doctor's office
that he would be late, the plaintiff was informed that Dr. Hagman
would not treat him. The plaintiff was never advised of his physical
condition by Dr. Hagman nor referred to another physician. Subsequently, the plaintiff's condition worsened and his leg was amputated. Citing a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, 3 which held
that "privity [of contract] is not an indispensable prerequisite to establishing a duty of care between a non-client and an attorney in a
suit for legal malpractice . . . ,"s the court ruled that a duty arose
imposing an obligation on Dr. Hagman for the benefit of the plaintiff. The court reasoned that
[tlo a physician alleged to have knowledge that the patient reinformed the patient that his back was "all right." Approximately two years later, the plaintiff
suffered a herniated lumbar disc as a result of lifting a heavy weight. In grappling,.with the
propriety of a directed verdict for the physician defendant, the court ruled that the failure to
inform the patient about his physical condition and the resultant limitation was a question for
the jury, particularly in light of expert testimony that the failure to give the patient "specific
cautions" with respect to his back, or to warn him "of stresses and strains to the back" constituted a violation of the standard of care. Id. at 680.
30. 538 F.2d at 1136. But see Corbett v. Waitt, 445 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind. App. 1982)
(holding that when the duty to inform exists by virtue of the confidential relationship, the duty
is terminated when the relationship is terminated).
31. 538 F.2d at 1136. It is appropriate to note that the disclosure obligation of a physician has been extended to run in favor of a spouse or next of kin. In Wohlgemuth v. Meyer,
139 Cal. App. 2d 326, 293 P.2d 816 (1956), the court noted that the hospital-patient relationship is a fiduciary one, and the hospital has a duty to reveal all pertinent information. The
court stated "In the event of the death of the patient while under the care of the doctor and
the hospital, the spouse has a right to know the cause of death." Id. at 331, 293 P.2d at 820.
The court observed that withholding such information would essentially amount to misrepresentation. Similarly, in Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary & Casualty Hosp., 396 F.2d 931 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), the court ruled that a hospital had a duty to disclose to a deceased patient's son the
contents of the decedent's medical records.
32. 108 IIM.App. 3d 505, 439 N.E.2d 60 (1982).
33. Pelham v. Griesheimer, 92,I11. 2d 13, 440 N.E.2d 96 (1982).
34. Id. at 19, 440 N.E.2d at 99.

ferred to him by another doctor may have a malignancy of the
knee it would appear plaintiff's subsequent injury was reasonably likely and foreseeable. The magnitude of the burden of
guarding against such injury seems slight in these circumstances. A letter to plaintiff advising him of his condition and to
consult with another physician without delay might well have
been sufficient after defendant severed their relationship and declined to treat him. . . . Illinois also recognizes the duty of a
physician to ordinarily disclose to a patient a risk which was or
should have been known to the physician."'

The decision of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's action as to
defendant Hagman because of lack of a physician-patient relationship was reversed.
B.

Duty to Disclose Test Results and the Availability and Value

of Tests
The duty to disclose test results is a necessary component of the
general requirement to disclose disease or illness within a patient's
body. Although the requirement to disclose test results is an established legal responsibility, 6 it has expanded in recent years to require a physician to inform a patient of the availability and value of
35. 108 Il. App. 3d at 512, 439 N.E.2d at 65 (citing Bennett v. Raag, 103 Ill. App. 3d
321, 431 N.E.2d 48 (1982)). See also Doctor's Duty to Tell, 102 SoLIc. J. 850 (1958), which
discusses an English disclosure case, Chapman v. Rix, reported in The Times on November 11,
1958. In Chapman, the deceased had accidentally stabbed himself in the abdomen. The defendant physician decided that the wound was superficial and after stitching it up, advised the
patient to see his doctor that evening. When the patient's doctor called, the patient informed
him that the defendant had said the wound was superficial. The patient's doctor therefore
dismissed the wound as of no further significance, and diagnosed subsequent pain and nausea
as due to other causes. The patient eventually died because the knife had penetrated the small
bowel. The court decided that when a doctor makes a preliminary examination of a patient
and then tells him to see his own physician, the doctor who first examined him has a duty to
ensure that the subsequent treating physician has a sufficient picture of the first examination
and diagnosis to enable the subsequent treating physician to take proper steps on behalf of the
patient.
See also In re Jascalevich License Revocation, 182 N.J. Super. 455, 442 A.2d 635 (1982),
in which the physician had been found, inter alia, to have tampered with the integrity of his
patient's medical records. In one instance, he included a post operative note mentioning the
possibility of cancer when he knew the patient to be cancer-free, and in another situation he
knowingly permitted a forged operative record to become part of a patient's hospital record.
The court found that
a physician's duty to a patient cannot but encompass his affirmative obligation to
maintain the integrity, accuracy, truth and reliability of the patient's medical
record. His obligation in this regard is no less compelling than his duties respecting diagnosis and treatment of the patient since the medical community must, of
necessity, be able to rely on those records in the continuing and future care of
that patient. Obviously, the rendering of that care is prejudiced by anything in
those records which is false, misleading or inaccurate. We hold, therefore, that a
deliberate falsification by a physician of his patient's medical record . . . must
be regarded as gross malpractice endangering the health or life of his patient.
Id. at 471-72, 442 A.2d at 644-5.
36. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.3D 501 (1973) (discussing malpractice when a physician has
failed to notify a patient of an unfavorable test result or diagnosis).

tests. Further, failure to advise a pregnant patient or a patient considering pregnancy of available tests for potential birth defects may
result in liability not only to the patient (wrongful birth cases), but
also to the patient's child (wrongful life cases) when, had the patient
been properly informed, she would have chosen to avoid conception
or to terminate her pregnancy.
1. Test Results. - The duty to disclose test results is an established legal responsibility, necessitating a reasonable attempt to
notify the patient, or other personnel who would then notify the patient, of any abnormality that is revealed by a test. In Phillips v.
Good Samaritan Hospital,3 7 a radiologist was found liable for failing to communicate test results. There, a child was taken to an
emergency room with an arm injury. X-rays were taken but the physician who reviewed the X-rays failed to find or diagnose a fracture.
The next day a radiologist reading the X-rays did find a fracture.
These inconsistent findings were recorded in the hospital records but
never communicated to the child or his parents. Months later the
fracture was discovered and treated. In reversing summary judgment
in favor of the radiologist and his employer, the court ruled that liability could fairly be premised upon a failure to adequately communicate an otherwise accurate evaluation of diagnostic tests. The court
stated that "the communication of a diagnosis so that it may be beneficially utilized may be altogether as important as the diagnosis itself."38 Significantly, the court was unwilling to accept the radiologist's argument that, as a provider of "indirect medical care," he had
no disclosure obligation to the patient.3 9
A similar outcome is seen in Keene v. Methodist Hospital.40
The defendant hospital in Keene was found liable for failing to adequately communicate the results of X-rays which indicated the possibility of a skull fracture. The results were dictated into a recording
37. 65 Ohio App. 2d 112, 416 N.E.2d 646 (1979).
38. Id. at 115, 416 N.E.2d at 648. See also Ramsey v. Physicians Memorial Hosp., 36
Md. App. 42, 373 A.2d 26 (1977), in which the court held that the evidence supported liability
based upon a nurse's failure to adequately communicate a patient's history to the attending
physician.
39. In reaching this decision, the court stated:
Once the physician-patient relationship has been found to exist, as could well be
found here, the professional responsibilities and duties exist despite the lack of
proximity, or the remoteness, of contact between the two, as where a consulting
physician is involved in the case in only a limited manner. Therefore, all physicians involved in a case share in the same duties and responsibilities of the primary care physician to the extent of their involvement. It is incumbent upon
these medical professionals to coordinate their efforts in a manner that best
serves their patient's well-being.
65 Ohio App.2d at 116, 416 N.E.2d at 649.
40. 324 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Ind. 1971). For further discussion of this case, see Wilcox,
Consultant's Duty to Inform-He's Your Patient Too!, 76 TEx. MED. 66 (1980).

device and transcribed two days later, but were not otherwise communicated to the patient or other hospital personnel. If these results
had been effectively communicated, proper treatment of the patient
would have prevented his death. The court found the hospital liable
for the failure of itsadministrators to provide procedures through
which proper persons would have received the necessary information.
It also found that, given the serious injury involved and the inadequate communication procedures, the radiologist had a duty to communicate the results to the attending physician, the emergency room
or the hospital administration. The hospital was held liable for the
radiologist's failure to communicate effectively.41
The extent to which the duty to disclose test results to patients
has grown is noted in the case of Capuano v. Jacobs.'2 In Capuano,
the plaintiff entered the defendant hospital with a diagnosis of "sebaceous cyst" after complaining of "a small cut on the back of [the]
neck which didn't heal properly. 43 The hospital's staff radiologist
took X-rays of the plaintiff's back at the direction of her attending
physician. One of the pictures showed a light shadow or density in
the area of the plaintiff's right kidney, allegedly indicating a kidney
stone. The radiologist did not report the shadow, but confined his
remarks concerning the X-ray pictures to findings respecting the spinal area. The plaintiff was discharged with a final diagnosis of fibroepithelial polyp of the skin. Eventually, however, the kidney stone
was diagnosed and required surgical intervention. Despite the fact
that the hospital had not been directed to X-ray the plaintiff's kidney
or that particular area of the body, failure to disclose the incidental
discovery of a shadow on one of the X-rays resulted in liability. 4
Thus, Capuano suggests that a physician's disclosure obligation extends even to remotely identified abnormalities in the patient's
45
body.
Additionally, courts consistently have held physicians liable for
breach of the duty to disclose test results when the impact of not
disclosing diagnostic information would have a cumulative effect on
the patient's exercise of control over his or her own body. In Steele v.
41. A reasonableattempt to communicate results to the patient or others is required.
See Ray v. Wagner, 286 Minn. 354, 176 N.W.2d 101 (1970) (holding that a physician is
under a duty to take whatever steps are reasonable to notify a patient of test results which
show the possibility of cancer).
42. 33 A.D.2d 743, 305 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1969).
43. Id. at 7", 305 N.Y.S.2d at 838 (Eager, J. dissenting).
44. Judge Eager offered a strong dissent from which pertinent facts set forth in the text
have been gleaned.
45. The dissent in Capuano observed that expert testimony revealed that the shadow
shown on the X-ray was not necessarily indicative of any kidney involvement and was not
sufficient to support a diagnosis of the presence of a kidney stone. Id. at 744-45, 305 N.Y.S.2d
at 839.

St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.,4 6 for example, the plaintiff
had been diagnosed as having foci, or localized areas, of carcinoma
in situ following a dilatation and curettage 47 and cold conization.4"
She was informed of her physician's belief that all the cancerous
cells had been removed but was instructed to return regularly for a
pap smear. The first two pap smears were negative. She was unable
to schedule further appointments with her attending physician, who
had retired. She then scheduled an appointment with the defendant
physician, Dr. Richard Clement, who convinced her to have a hysterectomy. In a subsequent lawsuit premised upon allegedly unnecessary surgery, the plaintiff asserted, inter alia, that the defendant had
failed to disclose the results of a negative pap smear before convincing her of the necessity of the hysterectomy.4 9 The patient contended
that had she been so informed, she may not have consented to the
surgery in light of the two prior negative pap smears, especially since
the cumulative indication of those tests was that the plaintiff was not
in demonstrable danger. The court held that because the test results
were material to a decision by the patient, failure to inform her of
the negative pap smear constituted a breach of the physician's duty
to disclose.50
These cases confirm the emphasis placed upon personal autonomy and the free exercise of self-determination by those courts that
have considered the disclosure obligation in the context of the physician-patient relationship. Similar judicial thinking is seen in cases
focusing upon the availability and value of procedures intended to
better apprise individuals of their medical condition.
2. Availability and Value of Tests. (a) Overview. - The duty
to disclose test results has been expanded to include disclosure of the
availability and value of tests. Several significant cases defining the
scope of a physician's responsibility in this area have been decided in
recent years. In Truman v. Thomas,51 for example, the California
46. 371 So. 2d 843 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
47. During this procedure, a physician scrapes out the lining of the uterus to evaluate
its condition and identify any abnormality. Id. at 845 n.2.
48. "This is an operation where a large portion of the cervical canal including its epithelium or lining tissue is cut out." Id. at 846 n.3.
49. Since the physician was unable to state with certainty that he had informed the
patient of the test results, the court accepted the patient's testimony that he had failed to do
so. Id. at 850.
50. That the physician had no actual knowledge of the prior tests was of no import
given that the patient had included this information in the history she gave to the physician.
The physician thus had constructive knowledge of the results. Id. at 850 n.9.
51. 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980). For an in-depth discussion of this case, see O'Neil, Truman v. Thomas: The Rise of Informed Refusal, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 1067 (1981). See also Belier, From Informed Consent to a Duty to Convince: Truman v. Thomas, 18 Hous. L. REV. 917 (1981); Cluff, California Supreme Court
Expands the Informed Consent Doctrine; Physicians Have a Duty to Obtain an Informed

Supreme Court decided a case in which the patient's family physician failed to perform a pap smear upon her and she later died of
cervical cancer. Expert testimony in the case established that if the
patient had undergone a pap smear at any time during the five-year
period she was being treated by her physician, the cervical tumor
would have been discovered in time to save her life. The central issue
in the case thus became whether the attending physician breached
his duty to the patient by failing to inform her of the potentially
fatal consequences of allowing cervical cancer to develop undetected
by a pap smear. In reaching the decision that a physician must disclose relevant data to a patient regarding the value of a diagnostic
test, the court stated, "The duty to disclose [is] imposed . . . so that
patients might meaningfully exercise their right to make decisions
about their own bodies." 2
The dissenting opinion in Truman predicted an unreasonable
expansion of the physician's duty to disclose as a result of the majority opinion:
Carried to its logical end, the majority decision requires physicians to explain to patients who have not had a recent general
examination the intricacies of chest examinations, blood analyses, X-ray examinations, electrocardiograms, urine analyses and
innumerable other procedures. In short, today's ruling mandates
doctors to provide each such patient with a summary course covering most of his or her medical education. Most medical tests
- like pap smears - are designed to detect illness which might
prove fatal absent timely treatment. Explaining the purposes of
each procedure to each such patient will obviously take hours if
not days.58
Similarly, other recent decisions have found potential liability
for failure to inform a patient of the availability of a test. In LeBeuf
v. Atkins, 5" a dentist failed to inform his patient that a blood presRefusal: Truman v. Thomas, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 933; Kold & Ramseyer, Truman v.
Thomas: Informed Refusal in Simple Diagnostic Testing, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 1105 (1981);
Thies, Truman v. Thomas: Informed Consent, the Physician'sIncreasing Burden, 8 W.S.U. L.
REV. 113 (1980).
52. 27 Cal.3d at 292, 611 P.2d at 906, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
53. Id. at 298, 611 P.2d at 910, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 316. (Clark, J. dissenting). In the
case of Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 191 Conn. 282, 465 A.2d 294 (1983), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a lower court erred in instructing a jury that a doctor, in obtaining a patient's informed consent, need not disclose to the patient any alternative that is
more hazardous than the procedure recommended by the physician. The court felt that the
lower court's instruction relieved the physician of the duty to discuss alternatives with patients,
and substituted merely a duty to recommend the safest procedure, presumably the one contemplated by the physician. This was deemed incompatible with the requirement that a patient be
provided with sufficient information to make intelligent decisions.
54. 28 Wash. App. 50, 621 P.2d 787 (1980). LeBeuf clarifies to a certain extent the
Washington Supreme Court's language in Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 250-51, 595 P.2d
919, 922-23 (1979), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 21-24, that "[tihe patient's

sure test was available before the dentist injected an anesthetic. Following administration of the anesthetic, the patient suffered a cere-

bral hemorrhage. The court held that the patient was "[cllearly...
entitled to be informed of this 'simple' test which possibly might
have prevented his stroke, and subsequent disability and death.""5
These cases illustrate the physician's obligation to disclose the
availability of tests as well as the value of such information to a
patient in making an informed and intelligent decision. Excellent examples of judicial focus on this fiduciary obligation are found in the
wrongful birth and wrongful life decisions.
(b) Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life. - In recent years,
there has been an increase in actions against physicians predicated
upon a failure to advise the patient before pregnancy or childbirth of
potential birth defects in the child. These cases articulate a duty to
provide information regarding either the existence of a medical condition which might result in the birth of a defective child or the
availability of tests to determine whether such defects exist. Patients
are recovering damages for the failure of physicians to disclose adequately when that failure deprives parents of the opportunity to
make an informed decision on parenthood. Although a thorough discussion of the entire area of wrongful birth and wrongful life is beyond the scope of this article,"" some exploration of the extent of a
physician's duty to disclose in this context is necessary.
Historically, two cases establish the basic precedent in this area.
In Jacobs v. Theimer,51 decided in 1975 by the Supreme Court of
Texas, the court allowed a cause of action against a physician who
negligently failed to diagnose rubella in a pregnant woman and to
advise the father and pregnant mother of the risk to the child.5"
right to know is not confined to the choice of treatment once a disease is present and has been
conclusively diagnosed. Important decisions must frequently be made in many nontreatment
situations in which medical care is given, including procedures leading to a diagnosis .
55. 28 Wash. App. at 56, 621 P.2d at 790.
56. A significant amount of literature on the topic is available. See, e.g., Brahams,
Damages for Unplanned Babies-A Trend To Be Discouraged? 133 NEw L.J. 643 (1983);
Clinite, Wrongful Birth: The Appropriate Measure of Damages, 70 ILL. B.J. 772 (1982);
Cray, "Wrongful Life" Dilemma, 2 CAL. LAW. 52 (1982); Healey, The Physician's Duty to
Disclose: The New York Cases Iand 1, 43 CONN. MED.249, 329 (1979); Klodowski, Wrongful Life and a Fundamental Right to Be Born Healthy: Park v. Chessin: Becker v. Schwartz,
27 BUFFALO L. REV. 537 (1978); Parness & Pritchard, To Be or Not To Be: Protecting the
Unborn's Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 257 (1982); Persky, Wrongful Life: The
Dawning of a New Cause of Action in Illinois? 71 ILL. B.J. 594 (1983); Slade, Death of
Wrongful Life: A Case for Resuscitation? 132 NEW L.J. 874 (1982); Comment, Wrongful
Life: A Finally Recognized Tort, 8 J.Juv. L. 127 (1984); Comment, Torts: Wrongful Birth
and Wrongful Life Causes of Action, 1983 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 675 (1984). See generally
Annot., Tort Liability for Wrongfully Causing One to Be Born, 83 A.L.R.3D 15 (1978).
57. 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
58. Interestingly, the court deemed it of no importance that abortion was illegal at the
time of the treatment, and thus the parents effectively had no legal option but to have the
child. Even though the physician could not perform an abortion, he still had a duty to inform

Likewise, in Park v. Chessin," the court found that a physician's

failure to give his pregnant patient sufficient information concerning
her condition so that she could reasonably decide whether to continue or abort her pregnancy stated a cause of action in medical
malpractice.
Since these significant cases were decided, courts have recognized a broad duty to disclose within the much-litigated wrongful
birth/wrongful life context. In some states, the right to recover for a
breach of duty has been expanded to include not only wrongful birth
claims by the parents but also an independent right on the part of

the child to recover for wrongful life."0

the patient. It was no defense that the abortion could not have been legally performed and the
physician's providing of information would not have constituted a violation of the law against
abortion. The dissent, however, would have found for the defendants because abortion was
illegal. For further discussion of this case, see Kass & Shaw, The Risk of Birth Defects:
Jacobs v. Theimer and Parents' Right to Know, 2 AM. J.L. & MED. 213 (1976-77), in which
the authors discuss the implications of Jacobs. They view the case as a highly significant decision leading to a duty to tell parents before pregnancy of the risk that a defective child may be
born. The authors note that there seems to be a gradually increasing trend toward more and
more disclosure. "Jacobs v. Theimer is an important precedent with regard to the responsibility of physicians and genetic counselors to keep their patients fully informed." Id. at 243.
More recently, Dr. Shaw has addressed this responsibility of physicians and genetic counselors
in discussing a new diagnostic tool, the chorionic villi biopsy (CVB). This test provides a new
method for making prenatal diagnosis of chromosomal and biochemical defects during the
eighth to tenth week of pregnancy by obtaining a biopsy of fetal cells from the chorionic villi.
Dr. Shaw states, "When [the CVB'sJ safety and reliability is established, an argument can be
made for screening all pregnancies or at least offering the mother the option of CVB even if no
increased risks to the fetus are discerned." Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus,
5 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 77 (1984).
59. 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), affd as modified sub nom Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
60. To date, the clear trend in the law has been to limit the right of recovery to the
parents. This trend, and the reason therefor, is discussed in the recent case of Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal.3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982). There, the California Supreme
Court stated, "Although the overwhelming majority of decisions in other jurisdictions recognize the right of parents to maintain an action under these circumstances, the out-of-state
cases have uniformly denied the child's right to bring what has been commonly termed a
'wrongful life' action." Id. at 221, 643 P.2d at 955, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 338. The court further
noted:
In recent years many courts in other jurisdictions have confronted similar claims
brought by both parents and children against medical professionals whose negligence had allegedly proximately caused the birth of hereditarily afflicted children. The overwhelming majority of the recent cases have permitted parents to
recover at least some elements of damage in such actions. . . . At the same time,
the out-of-state authorities have uniformly rejected the children's own claims for
general damages. ...
The explanation for the divergent results is that while courts have been willing to permit parents to recover for medical costs or -in some cases-other
harms which the parents would not have incurred "but for" the defendant's negligence, they have been reluctant to permit the child to complain when, but for
the defendant's negligence, he or she would not have been born at all. In this
context the recent decisions have either concluded that the child has sustained
no "legally cognizable injury" or that appropriate damages are impossible to
ascertain.
Id. at 225-226, 643 P.2d at 957, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
Although the majority of jurisdictions have refused to recognize a wrongful life claim, it
has been predicted that the number of such cases will grow and a cause of action will be

In a recent landmark decision, Turpin v. Sortini, the California Supreme Court recognized a child's wrongful life claim for the
extraordinary expenses of special training and equipment necessitated by her affliction. The court addressed the issue of whether a
child born with an hereditary affliction could maintain a tort action
against a medical care provider who before the child's conception
negligently failed to advise the child's parents of the possibility of
the hereditary condition, depriving them of the opportunity to choose
not to conceive the child. In finding that the child had a valid cause
of action, the court stated that it would be "illogical and anomalous"
to permit recovery of the cost of the child's medical care only by the
parents. Such a distinction would condition the child's recovery "on
the wholly fortuitous circumstance of whether the parents are available to sue and recover such damages or whether the medical expenses are incurred at a time when the parents remain legally responsible for providing such care." 62 The court concluded that a
child in a wrongful life action, though not entitled to general damages for being born impaired as opposed to not being born at all,
may recover special damages for the extraordinary expenses necessary to treat the hereditary ailment.6"
Following the decision in Turpin, the California Appellate
Court, in Call v. Kezirian," emphasized that when treating a pregnant, middle-aged woman the physician has a duty to advise the patient of the availability of amniocentesis to test for Down Syndrome.
The physician is further obligated to disclose the results of such a
test in order to permit the patient to decide whether to seek an abortion or permit the fetus to develop to the point of delivery. Addressing the necessity for disclosing to the patient the availability of the
amniocentesis test, the court stressed that a lay person would not be
aware that the possibility of giving birth to a child with Down Syndrome can be predicted during pregnancy. 5 The court stated:
recognized. Suits to Change Medicine, Doctors Warn, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Oct. 25, 1982, at 1,
reporting on a symposium held by the American College of Legal Medicine:
The ramifications of wrongful life suits extend beyond obstetricians and gynecologists to all doctors who treat pregnant patients.. . . Medical laboratories that
have failed to detect genetic complications have also been defendants in wrongful life suits brought in California. . . . To avoid wrongful life suits, a doctor
should "take a decent family [health) history and decent physical."
But see Rubin v. Hamot Medical Center, (Pa. Super., No. 1046, July 13, 1984); Ellis v. Sherman, (Pa. Super. No. 00192 HBG 83, June 29, 1984); and Nelson v. Krusen, 52 U.S.L.W.
2325, Dec. 13, 1983 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 11/16/83), wherein the courts of Pennsylvania and Texas
have recently refused to recognize a cause of action for wrongful life.
61. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
62. Id. at 238, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
63. Id. Accord Procanik v. Cillo, 53 U.S.L.W. 2091, Aug. 21, 1984 (No. A-89, N.J.
Sup. Ct., Aug. 1, 1984).
64. 135 Cal. App. 3d 189, 185 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1982).
65. The court addressed this issue in the context of determining whether the cause of

"While that medical test may be well known to a small, sophisticated and educated portion of the nonmedical population, we can not
say that a reasonable person not trained in medicine should have
known that amniocentesis testing could have revealed the abnormality prior to birth."'
More recently, the Supreme Court of Washington in Harbeson
v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 7 recognized a cause of action sounding both in
wrongful life and wrongful birth. In Harbeson, the plaintiffs brought
an action premised upon injury suffered as a result of birth defects in
two children who were conceived and delivered while their mother
took the drug Dilantin to control epilepsy. The parents claimed that
had they been informed of the potential birth defects associated with
the use of Dilantin during pregnancy, they would not have had the
children. In addressing the applicable disclosure obligation, the court
noted that the ability to predict the occurrence and recurrence of
defects attributable to genetic problems has improved considerably.
The court concluded that these medical developments should benefit
parents in the form of a right to prevent the birth of a defective child
and a correlative duty imposed on health care providers to provide
information material to making a determination whether to avoid
8
conception.6
(c) Terminal Illness. - No discussion of a physician's duty to
fully disclose a patient's medical condition is complete without consideration of the legal obligation to inform a terminally ill patient
that death is imminent. While there are no reported cases specifically mandating the disclosure of terminal illness to a patient, the
existence of such a legal duty may be gleaned from related decisions.
These cases address the duty to disclose available tests to diagnose
terminal or potentially terminal illness,' 9 the duty to disclose any abnormalities revealed by such tests,7 0 and the duty to disclose sufficient information to permit a competent terminally ill patient to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment."
The courts have firmly established that the patient is entitled to
know enough to choose the course his or her future medical care will
take. 2 Thus, "the physician's duty requires him to alert the patient
action was
66.
67.
68.

barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
135 Cal. App.3d at 198, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
Id. at 483, 656 P.2d at 491.

69.
70.
71.
52 N.Y.2d
72.

See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
See supra text accompanying notes 37-50.
See Matter of Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Matter of Storar,
363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
See Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 249-51, 595 P.2d 919, 923 (1979).

of medical abnormalities whatever the stage of treatment. 7 3 When

terminal illness is involved, it is of the utmost importance that the
patient be provided the necessary information to exercise full control
over his or her being.

In a recent Washington Supreme Court decision 75 concerning
the right of a terminally ill patient to have life-sustaining treatment
withheld or withdrawn, the court stated: "This right to be free from
nonconsensual invasions of one's bodily integrity. . , requires physicians to disclose to a patient all materialfacts and risks concerning
the patient's condition . . . " including "the possibility of alternative treatment or no treatment at all. Thus, freedom of choice with
respect to medical treatment encompasses the right to refuse life-

sustaining treatment in certain circumstances.

'6

In order to exercise

freedom of choice when one's death is imminent, it is essential that
the decision-maker fully understand the nature and scope of the ter-

minal condition.
The importance of autonomous decision-making in the context
of terminal illness is also recognized as one of the public policies
underlying Natural Death Legislation. These laws typically empha-

size the right of the individual to make an informed decision on the
nature and extent of treatment received following diagnosis of an
incurable terminal illness. 7 Thus, these statutes reinforce the need

for full and complete disclosure of information to incurable
73. Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 95 Wash. 2d 306, 315, 622 P.2d 1246, 1252 (1980)
(emphasis added).
74. One court has discussed the terminally ill patient's rights as follows:
[T] he constitutional right to privacy, we believe, encompasses the freedom of the
terminally ill but competent individual to choose for himself whether or not to
decline medical treatment where he reasonably believes that such treatment will
only prolong his suffering needlessly, and serve merely to denigrate his conception of the quality of life. The decision by the incurably ill to forego medical
treatment and allow the natural processes of death to follow their inevitable
course is so manifestly a "fundamental" decision in their lives that it is virtually
inconceivable that the right of privacy would not apply to it.
Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 432, 458-59, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 539 (1980).
75. In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983) (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 121-22, 660 P.2d at 743 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
77. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110
§§701-710 (1983), which sets forth the underlying purpose of the law:
The legislature finds that persons have the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical care, including the decision
to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal condition.
Id. §701. Similar Natural Death Acts are in effect in almost one third of the states. Ahern,
California, Illinois Enact Methods to Allow Patients the Right to Refuse Treatment, HEALTH
L. VIGIL, Nov. 25, 1983, at 8; see also, SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, 1981 HANDBOOK
(1981). This handbook, which analyzes the Right-to-Die laws enacted through 1981, observes
that such statutes are "an extension of the individual's right to informed consent." Id. at 1.
And see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
MENT

310-87 (1983) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S

COMMISSION].

TREAT-

8

patients.7
In addition to Natural Death Laws, which tend to be quite
broad in scope, more specific legislation exists in certain jurisdictions
governing full disclosure in the context of treatment of certain types
of potentially terminal conditions. For example, some state statutes
require a physician to explain to a patient all of the viable alternatives in the treatment of breast cancer. The first such law was enacted in Massachusetts as part of its Patients' Rights legislation. 79
The Massachusetts law provides:
Every patient or resident of a facility shall be provided by
the physician in the facility the right:
(h) in the case of a patient suffering from any form of breast
cancer, to complete information on all alternative treatments
which are medically viable."0
California has enacted a similar provision:
The failure of a physician and surgeon to inform a patient by
means of a standardized written summary, as developed by the
department on the recommendation of the Cancer Advisory
Council, in layman's language and in a language understood by
the patient of alternative efficacious methods of treatment which
may be medically viable

. . .

when the patient is being treated

for any form of breast cancer constitutes unprofessional conduct.
81

In addition, recent medical ethics and medical-legal literature
strenuously promotes the view that a dying patient must be told the
prognosis. 82 One author emphasizes that this is true regardless of the
78. An example of the manner in which Natural Death Legislation encourages, if not
mandates, physician disclosure of terminal illness is seen in the following excerpt from the
District of Columbia natural death statute:
Physician's duty to confirm terminal condition.(a) An attending physician who
has been notified of a [right to die] declaration executed under this subchapter
. . . shall take the necessary steps to provide for written certification and confir(c) An attending physimation of the declarant's terminal condition.......
cian who does not comply with this section shall be considered to have committed an act of unprofessional conduct.

D.C.

CODE ANN.

79.

§6-2425 (Supp. 1983).

Annas, Radical Faith: The Right Stuff? NURSING L. & ETHIcs, Apr. 1980, at 3.

MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 11l, §70E (Michie Law. Coop. Supp. 1983).
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1704.5 (West Supp. 1983). See Annas, Breast
Cancer: The Treatment of Choice, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1980, at 27; Marcial, California Breast Cancer Law, CANCER J. CLINICIANS, Nov.-Dec. 1982 (in a letter to the editor,

80.
81.

the author argues in favor of the law).
82. See, e.g., M.D. HEIFETZ & C. MANGEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 25 (1975) (emphasizing the patient's right to know the most important details of the terminal illness); A.J. RosOFF,
supra note 7, at 55-56 (disclosure is the best policy where at all possible: "A physician who is

availability or unavailability of therapeutic options: "Even in the absence of therapeutical options, and thus with no 'right to die' at
stake, the terminal patient's right to truth is a right by itself, a sa-

cred right for its own sake, besides its practical bearing on a person's
extra-medical arrangements in response to such a truth.""sa
Another commentator observes that pragmatic reasons, as well
asked directly by the patient whether death is likely would be well advised to answer truthfully"); Appleton, The Importance of Psychiatrists' Telling Patients the Truth, 129 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 742 (1977) (focusing on disclosure to patients by psychiatrists: "To summarize
current medical opinion on the matter: Tell the patient the truth about whether or not he has a
fatal illness if he really wants to know."); Hagman, The Medical Patient's Right to Know:
Report on a Medical-Legal-Ethical,Empirical Study, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 758 (1970) (discussing various areas in which the patient's right to know may arise, the law in each such area,
the medical profession's response thereto [from surveys], and the interplay of law and medical
ethics); Haney & Colson, Ethical Responsibility in Physician-PatientCommunication, 7 ETHICS, SCI. & MED. 27 (1980) (indicating that a patient has the right to hear the truth); Higgs,
Case Conference, 8 J. MED. ETHICS 48 (1982) (discussing a case in which the patient had
terminal illness but was not told until two days before her death. The author observes that the
damage to a patient through a failure to disclose such a condition may be an anxiety that
keeps the patient alive. When the patient is told, then psychologically she can prepare for
death and allow herself to die. If she does not know, then she may hang onto life, out of a
feeling that she is not supposed to die. The author concludes with a frank criticism of the
failure to disclose in such a situation: "If these manoeuvres of deception or evasion create false
plans, obstruct dying, and by contamination reduce the power of medicine for other patients
through their mistrust of doctors to reassure and make well, it appears that the apparent balance of benefit and harm that most doctors have in mind when confronted with terminal illness
must be altered." Id. at 50); Leikin, An Ethical Issue in PediatricCancer Care: Nondisclosure
of a Fatal Prognosis, PEDIATRIC ANNALS, Oct. 1981, at 37 (discussing the issues of truthtelling and deception in pediatric cancer care, paternalism, and the autonomy of the minor
from psychological and ethical points of view); Olson, Cancer and the Patient, 81 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 696 (1974) (stressing candor with patients who have cancer); Reiser, Words
as Scalpels: Transmitting Evidence in the Clinical Dialogue,92 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 837
(1980) (providing both an historical perspective and a current view regarding the disclosure of
a patient's terminal condition); Rosenfeld, At Risk for Huntington's Disease: Who Should
Know What and When, Hastings Center Rep., June 1984, at 5 (recommending disclosure to
persons afflicted); Turnbull, The Relationship of the Surgeon to the Patient with Advanced
Malignant Disease, N.Z. MED. J., Nov. 12, 1980, at 354 (urging increased communication
and caring to help the patient die in a comfortable manner, emphasizing the need for adequate
and frank communication, and discussing the patient's right to know); Weir, Truthtelling in
Medicine, PERSPS. BIOLOGY & MED., Fall 1980, at 95 (reasons are given for regarding
truthtelling as a moral obligation applicable to all medical fields); Yarling, Ethical Analysis of
a Nursing Problem: The Scope of Nursing Practice and Disclosing the Truth to Terminal
Patients, SUPERVISOR NURSE, June 1978, at 28 (pointing out that lying undermines the physician-patient relationship and results in an erosion of trust). See also Meisel & Roth, Toward
an Informed Discussion of Informed Consent: A Review and Critiqueof the Empirical Studies, 25 ARZ. L. REv. 265 (1983).
Given that there is a duty to disclose, an issue that often arises is how to disclose. See,
e.g., Churchill, Interpretationsof Dying: Ethical Implicationsfor Patient Care, 6 ETHICS, SCI.
& MED. 211 (1979) (emphasizing that patients should be told but in the best manner possible); Cousins, A Layman Looks at Truth Telling in Medicine, 244 J.A.M.A. 1929 (1980)
(observing that the real issue is not whether the truth should be told but whether it can be told
in a responsible manner); Martin, Some Ethical Issues in Disclosure of Progressive Diseases
of the Nervous System, 71 S. MED. J. 792 (1978) (discussing how to handle two different
patients with two different serious diseases-communication depends on the situation). See
also Anderson, A PracticalApproach to Teaching about Communication with Terminal Cancer Patients, 54 J. MED. EDUC. 823 (1979) (providing a model through which students can
learn about death and dying).
83. Jonas, The Right to Die, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1978, at 31, 34.

as reasons of patient autonomy, justify full disclosure." Patients who
are denied the truth cannot make informed decisions on medical care
and treatment and may withdraw consent to beneficial treatment because they are unable to appreciate its importance. There may also
be important personal and financial matters that require attention. 5

Finally, a patient who is not aware of his or her condition will likely
be surrounded by health care providers and family acting out roles in
a complex and elaborate farce that may result in worry, conjecture
and degradation on the part of the patient. This may well cause
more torment than knowledge of the illness itself.86 In addition, the
patient is denied the opportunity of full and intense communication
and interaction with loved ones during this final stage of life and

thus may die in isolation and loneliness.8 " This commentator appropriately concludes that "in the very great majority of instances, even

including those in which there is concern that the patient may not
initially respond well to frankness, a policy of truth is best for all
'88
concerned.

Studies of physician attitude and practice also indicate a strong
trend toward disclosure. This trend represents a dramatic change in
attitude during the past twenty years or so. In 1961, one widely discussed study indicated that 90% of those physicians surveyed generally did not tell their cancer patients about the diagnosis. 9 In a 1978
study,9 0 98% of physicians surveyed had a general policy to disclose
the presence of cancer to a patient and two-thirds of this group never
or rarely made an exception to this rule. 1 This study further discovered that 100 percent of those surveyed wanted to be told of a can84. Green, Truthtelling in Medical Care, in M.D. HILLER, MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE
LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 187 (1981).
85. id.
86. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 77, at 56.
87. Green, supra note 84, at 189. Jonas observes that "[iIying to the stricken in disregard of his credibly evinced will is cheating him of the transcendent possibility of his selfhood
to be face to face with his mortality when it is about to meet him." Jonas, supra note 83, at
34.
88. Green, supra note 84, at 190. The view of the President's Commission is that
"health professionals should ensure that patients understand (1)their current medical status,
including its likely course if no treatment is pursued; (2) the interventions that might be helpful to the patient...; and (3) in most cases, a professional opinion as to the best alternative."
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 77, at 52. See also Wanzer, Adelstein, Cranford,
Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safar, Stone, Taussig & Van Eys, The Physician's Responsibility
Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 955 (1984). The authors emphasize
that a decision not to tell the patient the truth is rarely if ever justified.
89. Oken, What to Tell Cancer Patients:A Study of Medical Attitude, 175 J.A.M.A.
1120 (1961).
90. Novack, Plumer, Smith, Ochitill, Morrow, & Bennett, Changes in Physicians' Attitudes toward Telling the Cancer Patient, 241 J.A.M.A. 897 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Novack]. See Telling the Cancer Patient, Letter to the Editor, 242 J.A.M.A. 1847 (1979)
(commenting on the Novack Study).
91. Novack, supra note 90, at 898. But see Veatch, When Should the Patient Know? 8
BARRISTER 3 (1981) (statistics indicate patients want to be told but also indicate doctors do
not tell).

cerous condition92 and 100 percent of the physicians who responded
thought the patient had the right to know of the cancer."3
The 1978 study suggested that physicians had changed their at-

titudes in part because cancer is more curable today and also because public awareness of cancer has increased public interest in
death and dying. In addition, "[t]he rise in the consumerism move-

ment and increasing public scrutiny of the medical profession have
altered the physician-patient relationship. In this era of 'patients'
rights,' an attitude of frankness feels right and, indeed, given the
current disputatious atmosphere of medical practice, may be the saf-

est one to adopt."94
The President's Commission concurred in this observation noting that "physicians may also be giving more information as a function of the increasingly broad and enforced legal duties of disclosure."

5

This trend is reasonable, given the likelihood of judicial

recognition of a specific cause of action premised upon failure to
fully disclose to a patient the nature and extent of a terminal

condition. 9"
92. Novack, supra note 90, at 899. In the President's Commission's survey of patient
provider relationships, "'[the public displayed an unflinching desire for the facts about their
condition, even dismal facts' "; 96% of the public stated specifically that they would want to
know of a diagnosis of cancer, and 86% said they would want a realistic prognosis." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 77, at 54. See also Gunby, What Patients Want: The Full
Facts, Please, 248 J.A.M.A. 2210 (1982); Note, The Patient's Right to Know-A Reprise, 31
NURSING OUTLOOK 6 (1983).
93. Novack, supra note 90, at 899. The findings of the Novack study were basically
reinforced in two more recent studies: Greenwald & Nevitt, Physician Attitudes toward Communication with Cancer Patients, 16 Soc. Sci. MED. 591 (1982); Hardy, Green, Jordan &
Hardy, Communication between Cancer Patients and Physicians, 73 S. MED. J.755 (1980).
94. Novack, supra note 90, at 899. See also Telling the Cancer Patient, 56 S. AFR.
MED. J. 81 (1979) (reviews U.S. studies, especially the Novack study. The author suggests
reasons for the recent trend towards more disclosure by doctors today); Faden, Becker, Lewis,
Freeman & Faden, Disclosure of Information to Patients in Medical Care, 19 MED. CARE
718 (1981) (studies done to indicate amount told and amount patients want to be told about
seizures indicates patients are told less than they want to be). And see Goldberg, Disclosure of
Information to Adult Cancer Patients: Issues and Update, 2 J. CUNICAL ONCOLOGY 948
(1984). Cf. Ryan, Ethics and the Patient with Cancer,2 BRIT. MED. J. 480 (1979) (indicating
that in the Soviet Union, not telling patients about cancer is the norm).
95. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 77, at 55 (citing, inter alia, Note, Informed
Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632 (1974)).
96. Arguably, a suit for nondisclosure of terminal illness could be premised upon various tort theories, including fraud, misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and lack of informed consent. Professor John Robertson has indicated that under general principles of tort law, a person in a fiduciary relation to another could well be held liable for
nondisclosure of terminal illness or for distorting relevant information. J.A. ROBERTSON, THE
RIGHTS OF THE CRITICALLY ILL 6 (1983). Professors Shapiro and Spece also suggest that
where the clear and pronounced professional standard is to disclose a cancer diagnosis to a
terminal patient, a failure to disclose is likely an actionable breach of duty. M.H. SHAPIRO &
R.G. SPECE, BIOETHICS AND LAW 619-20 (1981); see also 37 Am.JUR. 2D Fraud & Deceit
§82 (1968) (false representations made by a physician as to the physical condition of a patient
legitimize a cause of action sounding in fraud). And see Estate of Leach v. Shapiro (No.
11238, Ohio App., May 2, 1984) (concerning a physician's failure to disclose to family members the true condition of a patient in a permanent chronic vegetative state. The court held
that failure to disclose information regarding a patient's condition may be actionable not only

III.

Post-Treatment Duty to Disclose

In addition to being obligated to fully inform a patient concerning medical condition prior to or at the time of treatment, a physician is also duty-bound to disclose certain information to a patient
following treatment. This latter responsibility has expanded in recent
years to include disclosure of a broad array of pertinent medical information. Although the duty to simply instruct a patient on post
operative or post-treatment care is well-established, 9" this responsibility has been significantly broadened to encompass not only a requirement of complete disclosure of all information necessary to enable a patient to decide whether to seek additional treatment, but
also a responsibility to warn a patient of subsequently discovered
danger from treatment previously provided.9 8
A.

Duty to Instruct

Crosby v. Grandview Nursing Home,9 9 a 1972 decision of
Maine's highest court, explicitly details the well-established duty of
a physician to instruct a patient as to post-treatment care. Crosby
was a workers' compensation case in which the patient was compensated for a foot injury and later attempted to secure additional com-

pensation for acute foot strain which developed after the injury. In
order to establish a causal link to the original injury thereby justifying compensation for the foot strain, she claimed the physician had
as malpractice but as misrepresentation or fraud as well).
Some judicial decisions offer support for an award of damages for mental anguish resulting from the infliction of emotional distress as a result of the nondisclosure of terminal illness.
See Vara v. Drago, 24 A.D.2d 88, 264 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1965) (patient received damages for
mental anguish suffered as a result of a physician's failure to disclose the presence of a dead
fetus in her body). See also Hume v. Bayer, 157 N.J. Super. 310, 428 A.2d 966 (1981) (physician told the parents of his patient that their child was suffering from a rare disease which
might be cancerous, knowing that the child had nothing more than a mildly infected appendix;
the court held that the parents established a sufficient basis for a cause of action premised
upon intentional infliction of emotional distress. Although no physical damage was alleged by
the plaintiffs, the court ruled that the severity of their emotional distress was sufficient). But
see Hoard v. Shawnee Mission Medical Center, 233 Kan. 267, 662 P.2d 1214 (1983) (holding
that damages could not be recovered for emotional distress and physical injuries caused by the
hospital's mistaken notification to parents that their daughter had died when, in fact, she was
in critical condition in another hospital). A good overview discussion of this topic is provided in
Stevens, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress by Physicians and Hospitals, 1982 MED.
TRIAL TECH. Q. 233 (discussing the trend of courts to award damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress as a separate cause of action, as opposed to joinder with a wellestablished malpractice claim).
97. The failure of a physician or surgeon to give a patient or his or her family or
attendants all necessary and proper instructions on the care and attention to be given to the
patient and the cautions to be observed is negligence which will render the physician liable for
the resulting injury. 70 C.J.S. Physicians & Surgeons §48 (1951). See also Christy v. Saliterman, 228 Minn. 144, 179 N.W.2d 288 (1968) (setting forth a physician's duty to give a
patient all necessary and proper instructions on the care and attention to be given to the
patient).
98. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.4TH 42 (1982).
99. 290 A.2d 375 (Me. 1972).

not properly informed her as to the type of shoes she should wear to
facilitate the healing process. The court found for the patient and
pronounced the following rule:
It is the duty of a physician or surgeon, even if personal attention is no longer necessary in the treatment of an injured limb, if
the case calls for it, to furnish the patient with instructions as to
its care, and his failure to do so, if it proximately aggravates the
original injury, would be actionable negligent conduct.'
A similar description of the physician's duty appears in the case
of Kerr v. Bock. 1' 1 There, in order to remove a bone tumor, a physician was required to remove a section of leg bone. He failed to properly caution the 67-year-old patient that the leg might break easily if
stressed. The patient was given no cast or brace, and the bone subsequently broke when "raised a little." The court found considerable
common knowledge amongst lay people that the patient's injuries
would ordinarily not have occurred in the absence of someone's negligence, 10 2 and accordingly found a res ipsa loquitor instruction
appropriate.
More recently, courts have expanded the duty to instruct to create liability to third parties in cases in which a physician fails to
specifically warn or instruct a patient. In Gooden v. Tips, 03 for example, a physician was sued for personal injuries sustained when one
of the plaintiffs was struck by a car driven by the physician's patient.
The plaintiffs alleged that the physician negligently prescribed the
drug Quaalude without instructing the patient not to drive while
under the influence of the drug. The physician filed a motion for
summary judgment claiming that since there was no physician-patient relationship between himself and the plaintiff, he owed no duty
to the plaintiff. The Texas appellate court rejected the argument,
finding that the physician did indeed owe a duty, not only to the
plaintiff but also to the general public, to protect against the reasonably foreseeable consequences of failing to warn his patient.' 0 '
100. Id. at 380.
101. 5 Cal. 3d 321, 486 P.2d 684, 95 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1971).
102. Id. at 323, 486 P.2d at 686, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 790. For an in-depth discussion of
Kerr, see Levinson, Physicians and Surgeons-Malpractice-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Res lpsa
Loquitur Based on the Jury's Common Knowledge Can Be Applied Where a Surgeon Fails to
Give a Specific Post-Operative Precautionary Instruction-Kerr v. Bock, 4 U. CIN. L. REV.
224 (1972) (the author distinguishes the post operative duty to issue precautionary instructions
from the "post-treatment communication cases" where physicians keep quiet to avoid being
sued. An element of bad faith is present in the latter example which is not present in the
former. Id. at 225 n.8).
103. 651 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983).
104. The court stated:
[T]he harm resulting to the plaintiffs was a reasonably foreseeable consequence
of the physician's failure to warn his patient not to drive. [The physician] knew,
or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that (the] patient's condi-

In another recent case, Myers v. Quesenberry,0 5 a pedestrian

who was struck by a vehicle driven by the patient of two physicians
sued the physicians for negligently failing to warn the patient
against driving in an uncontrolled diabetic condition. The court ruled
that "if a physician knows or should know a patient's condition will
impair her mental faculties and motor coordination,"' ° he has a
duty to "warn [her] not to drive or engage in other activities which
are likely to cause injury." '
In light of these decisions, it is clear that the scope of a physician's duty to instruct or warn with respect to physical condition or
injury has been expanded. The duty now requires a physician to describe the anticipated impact or effect of medicines and therapy on a
patient following initial treatment. Failing to comply with this disclosure obligation may render a physician liable not only to a patient
but to third parties who may foreseeably be injured.
B.

Duty to Disclose Relevant Information

Following treatment or surgery, specific information may be
known to a physician that should be disclosed to a patient in order to
ensure fulfillment of fiduciary duties. This information may include
discussion of a modified or altered approach to surgery necessitated
by the patient's condition, or frank disclosure of complications resulting despite the provision of due care. It is imperative that a physician disclose this information promptly following treatment or
surgery.
In Hershley v. Brown,'"8 a female patient consented to undergo
bilateral tubal ligation by burning, cauterizing or otherwise removing portions of her fallopian tubes. Several years later, however, following conception of a child, she became aware that her physician
tion (whether due to the effects of medication prescribed by the physician or
physical disability) could seriously impair the patient's ability to drive a motor
vehicle. Thus the harm resulting to the plaintiffs... "was in the general field of
danger which should reasonably have been foreseen by the doctor when he administered the drug," and the doctor was under a duty to take whatever steps
were reasonable under the circumstances to reduce the likelihood of injury to
other motorists.
Id. at 369-70.
105. 144 Cal. App. 3d 888, 193 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1983).
106. Id. at 891, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
107. Id. Confirming the holding in Gooden v. Tips, the court also stated: "When a physician furnishes medicine causing drowsiness, he probably should warn his patient not to drive
or engage in other activities which are likely to cause injury." Id. See also Bickel v. Mackie,
477 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Freese v. Lemmon, 210 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa 1973);
Wharton Transp. Corp. v. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. 1980); Kaiser v. Suburban Transp.
Sys., 65 Wash. 2d 461, 398 P.2d 14 (1965). See generally LeBlang, Epilepsy, Motor Vehicle
Licensure and the Law: The Physician's Rights and Responsibilities in Illinois, 10 LoY. U.
CHI. L.J. 203 (1979).
108. 655 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).

had actually performed the sterilization by inserting a tubal ring instrument. In a wrongful conception action, the plaintiffs, husband
and wife, charged that the defendant's failure to inform the patient
that he had performed surgical procedures different from those to
which she had consented, constituted fraudulent misrepresentation.
The defendant physician, Dr. Brown, argued that the decision
regarding the operative method used was a matter of medical judgment resting solely in the discretion of the physician. He argued that
a contrary decision would severely restrict "physicians in the exercise
of their best medical judgment in the method to be employed in performing an operation."' 0' Rejecting these assertions, the court held
that "fraud results from a physician's intentional concealment from
a patient of the fact that he performed a surgical procedure different
from that consented to." 110 Thus, by concealing that he had implanted an object in Mrs. Hershley's body without her consent, Dr.
Brown committed fraud.
A physician is thus obligated to apprise a patient of pertinent
developments during surgery which require an altered approach, particularly where implantation of a foreign object may be required."'
Any complications or untoward results of surgery or medical treatment must also be fully disclosed to a patient.
109. Id. at 678.
110. Id. at 677. The court noted the existence of a line of cases holding "that a physician's failure to inform a patient that he implanted a foreign object in the patient's body, when
such an object was not consented to, constitutes fraud." Id. at 676 (citing, inter alia, Hinkle v.
Hargens, 76 S.D. 520, 81 N.W.2d 888 (1957)); Bryson v. Aven, 32 Ga. App. 721, 124 S.E.
553 (1924). Cf. DiGiovanni v. Latimer, 390 Mass. 265, 454 N.E.2d 483 (1983), in which the
court considered the legal validity of a patient's claim against her physician that he negligently
or intentionally failed to inform her of the excision of a portion of the plaintiff's fallopian tube
during an operation to remove an ovarian cyst. The court specifically refrained from considering whether the failure to inform a patient of something that happened during a surgical
operation or other medical procedure breaches a legal duty: "We need not decide that issue
now, however, because we conclude that the plaintiff has not demonstrated that the defendant's alleged negligence caused her injuries which are legally compensable." Id. at 268, 454
N.E.2d at 485-86.
111. In Tabor v. Clifton, 63 Ga. App. 768, 12 S.E.2d 137 (1940), the Georgia appellate
court ruled that the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship imposes a duty upon
the physician to inform the patient of the nature and character of any operation that is performed on the patient. In Tabor, the patient alleged that during an authorized operation the
physician had, without her knowledge or authority, removed her right fallopian tube and right
ovary. The court ruled that where
the physician in performing an authorized operation has gone beyond the contract and performed another operation by removing vital organs from the patient's body which he had no authority to remove, and which it did not appear
were necessary to be removed, and where the patient did not know that the
physician in performing the operation had exceeded the contract and removed
such organs, but where the physician knew this, the concealment of these facts
by him from the patient, and his failure to inform the patient thereof, constituted fraud on the patient. . ..
Id. at 770, 12 S.E.2d at 139. See also Church v. Adler, 350 111.App. 471, 133 N.E.2d 327
(1953) (upholding an action sounding in deceit for a physician's fraudulent misrepresentation
with respect to the nature of surgery that had been performed upon the plaintiff).

In Taber v. Riordan,"' a patient suffered injury to the femoral
nerve in her right leg during surgery, following which she noticed
that her leg appeared to be shrinking. Although there was evidence
that the defendant knew the femoral nerve was not functioning, the
injury did not appear to have been the result of negligence. Nevertheless, when the plaintiff asked the defendant what was wrong, he
told her that "he did not have any idea what was wrong and could
not understand what happened but that these matters took time and
it was going to come back or it wasn't.""13 Although the issue could
not go to the jury because of a lack of expert testimony on the community standards of post-operative care owed by a physician, the
court commented specifically on the physician's duty to disclose:
"The duty to inform of possible complications before an operation or
course of treatment can be analogized to the duty to inform the patient afterwards of complications that have arisen.""'
This reasoning is also applicable when a physician treats a patient and subsequently becomes aware that the treatment might have
an adverse effect on the patient. In such instances, the physician has
a duty to communicate the potential dangers of past treatment to the
patient and perhaps even to recall the patient. An important case
reflecting this premise is Tresemer v. Barke." 5 In that case, the patient had visited the physician once, in 1972, for insertion of a birth
control device - a Dalkon Shield. The physician did not charge a
fee for this service. Two years later, serious questions regarding the
safety of this device were raised in the general medical community;
shortly thereafter, the device was withdrawn from the market. The
physician, however, allegedly never contacted the patient regarding
these developments. The patient sued the physician for failing to
warn her of the potential hazards of the device, which allegedly had
caused her to suffer injury. The lower court granted summary judgment for the physician. The appellate court, however, held that the
evidence was sufficient to warrant allowing the patient to establish
112. 83 II1. App. 3d 900, 403 N.E.2d 1349 (1980).
113. Id. at 903, 403 N.E.2d at 1352.
114. Id. at 904, 403 N.E.2d at 1353. For a variation of the duty to disclose in this
context, see Lockett v. Goodill, 71 Wash. 2d 654, 430 P.2d 589 (1967), in which the physicians allegedly failed to accurately inform the patient of the prognosis for recovery from paralysis following surgery prior to the patient's signing of a settlement release form. The Washington Supreme Court, finding the case to be premised on fraud and a breach of fiduciary duty,
stated:
Plaintiff's evidence, if believed, is sufficient to support the conclusion that defendants breached this trust when they did not inform him that they were unable to
predict that he would recover within a year. In the circumstances of the instant
case, defendants owed plaintiff the duty to inform him that his settlement premise was false and uninformed.
Id. at 433, 430 P.2d at 591.
115. 86 Cal. App. 3d 656, 150 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1979).

her case, notwithstanding the attenuated nature of the physician-patient relationship at the time of treatment. 116 The court held that a
cause of action for failure to warn arises because of the confidential
doctor-patient relationship. "It is not a malpractice cause of action
in the commonly understood sense but rather a malpractice action
from the imposed continuing status of physician-patient where the
danger arose from that relationship."' 7
Similarly, in Mink v. University of Chicago,"8 a lawsuit was
brought by women who were given diethylstilbestrol (DES) as part
of a medical experiment conducted by the defendants. The plaintiffs
asserted, among other things, that the defendants breached their
duty to inform them about their participation in the experiment and
that the defendants failed to subsequently disclose to them the link
between DES and cancer after learning of the relationship. The
court concluded that the defendants were obligated to notify the
plaintiffs of the risks inherent in DES. Having acknowledged a duty
to warn patients of the risks involved in treatment, the court added,
"The fact the knowledge of the risk was obtained after the patient
was treated does not alter the obligation. If the defendant fails to
notify the patient when the risk becomes known, he has breached
this duty.""'
The duty to seek out an individual who may be harmed as the
result of treatment previously given is vigorously addressed in the
case of Schwartz v. United States.21 0 In 1944, government physicians had inserted umbrathor, a radioactive contrast dye, into the
plaintiff's sinus for X-ray purposes. This drug was never removed
from his sinus. In 1957, carcinoma was diagnosed and physicians
had to perform radical surgery that included removing an eye and
116. See Stevens, The Physician's Liability for Gratuitous Advice, 1981 MED. TR.
TEcH. Q. 99.
117. Tresemer, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 667, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 394. See Now, Patient Recalls? TIME, Nov. 16, 1981, at 98, which discusses Tresemer and the duty to recall patients for
the purpose of informing them of new dangers in treatment which occurred years before. See
also Berg & Hirsh, Duty to Recall, 73 S. MED. J. 1041 (1980); Berg & Hirsh, Physician's
Duty to Recall Revisited, LEGAL AsP. OF MED. PRAC., Feb. 1983, at 5; Note, What You Don't
Know Will Hurt You: Physician's Duty to Warn Patients About Newly Discovered Dangers in
Previously Initiated Treatment, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 649 (1982). A perspective on the extent
to which this duty has expanded is offered in the earlier case of Cady v. Fraser, 122 Colo. 252,
222 P.2d 422 (1950). In Cady, the court stated:
Where there is no evidence that further treatment was needed than that admittedly prescribed, or that there was any other reason for explaining to plaintiff a
then existing condition . . . and no evidence that plaintiff suffered injury by lack
of knowledge as to such condition, failure to inform the patient thereof is not
malpractice.
Id. at 255, 222 P.2d at 424-25. Note that in Cady, after treatment of a pott's fracture of the
ankle, the physician did not disclose that there had been a nonunion of the bone. The physician
did, however, give a precautionary instruction.
1978).
118. 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill.
119. Id. at 720 (emphasis added).
120. 230 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964).

much of the bony structure, nervous system, muscle and tissue of the
left side of the patient's face.
According to the court, the umbrathor inserted in 1944 turned
out to be an extremely dangerous drug. Major medical journals reported grave warnings of the hazards of its use in the 1930's, and
new research and case studies confirming its carcinogenic properties
were documented and reported in the 1940's. The court therefore
concluded that the government physicians had been negligent in failing to notify former patients of the hazards of this drug. In its analysis, the court emphasized the very broad duty of physicians to "affirmatively [seek] out those who had been endangered after there
was knowledge of the danger in order to warn them that in the supposedly innocent treatment121there had now been found to lurk the
risk of devastating injury."'
In light of the above cases, it seems clear that a physician has
an obligation to inform patients of important information regarding
their medical condition following the provision of care and treatment. This duty is not triggered by specific patient questions but
rather exists independent of any such inquiry. Thus, it is not sufficient to wait for inquiry from a patient concerning a completed surgical operation; a physician must inform a patient that treatment
extended beyond the originally intended scope or that it involved an
alternate procedure regardless of whether a patient so inquires. Nor
is it sufficient to wait for a patient to inquire about the existence or
cause of post operative complications before providing a candid
description thereof. The physician must initiate the communication
of pertinent information to the patient or risk liability for failing to
comply with a recognized duty within the framework of the physician-patient relationship.
Moreover, the lapse of time following medical treatment must
not soften the physician's perception of this obligation. When a patient may be harmed because of prior treatment or when new information of critical importance is available concerning past care, a
physician has a duty to reasonably notify those affected individuals.
Only through such efforts can the physician fulfill the fiduciary responsibilities within the physician-patient relationship.
IV.

Duty to Disclose When Physician Employed by Third Party

In 1976, the Board of Directors of the American Occupational
Medical Association adopted the Code of Ethical Conduct for Physicians Providing Occupational Medical Services. This Code set forth
the following provisions concerning disclosure of information by oc121.

Id. at 540.

cupational physicians. Among other responsibilities, occupational
physicians were to
strive continually to improve medical knowledge, and . . communicate information about health hazards in timely and effective fashion to individuals or groups potentially affected, and
make appropriate reports to the scientific community; [and]
communicate understandably to those they serve any significant
observations about their health, recommending further study,
counsel or treatment when indicated ... .
The Code of Conduct impliedly recognizes that under appropriate
circumstances a disclosure obligation exists regardless of whether
there is an underlying physician-patient relationship.
Even though the duty to disclose information to a patient in a

third-party employer situation will not necessarily rest upon the
traditional fiduciary relationship between doctor and patient, courts
have found a disclosure obligation predicated upon general tort principles. Thus, if one assumes a duty where none existed initially, one
has a responsibility to act with reasonable care.1 2 The cases address-

ing this issue usually arise in situations in which an employer or insurer is solely responsible for providing or requiring that an individual undergo a medical examination. When a physician conducting an
examination reports the results only to the employer or insurer, there

may be-a breach of the disclosure obligation to the individual being
examined even in the absence of an express physician-patient rela-

tionship. Not only may a physician be liable for failing to disclose in
these situations, but an employer or insurer may also be held respon-

sible for the physician's nonfeasance.12

The seeds for the broad duty to disclose in this area were sown
in the 1964 Maryland decision of Hoover v. Williamson.'" In Hoo122. Code of Ethical Conduct for Physicians Providing Occupational Medical Services,
J. OccUp. MED., Aug. 1976, at cover page. See also Whorton & Davis, Ethical Conduct and
the Occupational Physician, 54 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 733 (1978) (duty to patient v. duty
to employer).
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §323 (1965) provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's
person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his
failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is
suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.
124. See Barber and Pickens, Physician's Liability in the Physical Examination of an
Employee, 73 TEX. MED. 115 (1977); Hoppe, Some Legal Problems of the Industrial Physician, 238 J.A.M.A. 1849 (1977); see also Annot., 69 A.L.R.2D 1213-21 (1960) for a discussion of the master's liability for failure to inform a servant of disease or physical condition
disclosed by medical examination.
125. 236 Md. 250, 203 A.2d 861 (1964). See Annot., 10 A.L.R.3D 1071 (1966). See
also Provost & Richards, The Company Doctor's Responsibility, TRIAL, Jul. 1981, at 35.
Several cases before Hoover found the employer liable for a failure to disclose. See, e.g.,
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1956). In Stapleton, the

ver, the plaintiff was examined by a company physician as part of
regularly scheduled employee evaluations. Following a chest X-ray,
the plaintiff was informed by the company physician that he had a
"little infection on the lungs." In reality, the X-ray revealed that
Hoover had silicosis. Allegedly, this information was deliberately
and willfully concealed from the plaintiff and his lung condition became serious and permanent as a result. Following initiation of the
plaintiff's lawsuit, the defendant asserted, inter alia, that he was not
required to disclose the X-ray information to the plaintiff. The defendant argued that no physician-patient relationship existed since
the examination had been conducted wholly at the request of the
employer. The court observed that one who gratuitously provides a
service that is necessary to another's bodily safety and that leads the
other to reasonably rely upon the service, is liable for harm resulting
from a failure to exercise reasonable care. 12 6 The duty imposed embraces the making of a full and complete disclosure regarding the
patient's condition.
Concurring in the rationale of Hoover, the court in Betesh v.
employer required that employees report periodically for medical examinations. The plaintiff
underwent an examination which revealed a tubercular condition. The physician claimed that
he had disclosed this fact to the patient; the patient claimed that he had not. The jury found
for the patient. The appellate court affirmed the lower court decision finding that the employer
had a duty to disclose to the employee what its records revealed regarding the patient's condition. Although finding no requirement that an employer provide employees with examinations,
the court found that once such examinations are provided, the employer owes the employee a
duty to disclose any negative results. This holding was followed in Harris v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 507 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Tenn. 1980), in which the court found that the TVA, as an
employer, had a duty to reveal the results of a pre-employment examination indicating a lung
abnormality.
126. The court stated that although ordinarily a physician-patient relationship is necessary, there is a "general rule that one who assumes to act even though gratuitously, may
thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all." Hoover, 236 Md. at
253-54, 203 A.2d at 863. See discussion of Jamison, infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text,
in which the court found a duty to disclose even though the patient had not paid for medical
services. The Jamison court, however, did not use general tort principles as a basis for liability
but found a physician-patient relationship.
127. Id. at 254, 203 A.2d at 863. The American Medical Association has taken the
position that "[a] physician-patient relationship does exist when a physician renders treatment
to an employee, even though the physician is paid by the employer." Current Ops. of the
Judicial Council of A.M.A., No. 5.09, 1984, at 23. See Kirshenbaum, Information Gap,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 14, 1982, at 10-11. In his Scorecard column, Mr. Kirshenbaum
described an incident involving Dallas Cowboy place kicker Rafael Septien. Team physicians
had discovered a hernia while treating Septien for a pulled groin muscle but chose not to tell
him since they felt that Septien would not aggravate the hernia further by kicking. Although
the medical condition never worsened, Septien later indicated he felt he had a right to be
informed. Dr. William Clancey, head of the University of Wisconsin's sports medicine department, agreed, saying that it is unethical for team doctors to fail to keep a player apprised of
his medical condition, regardless of who is paying the doctor bill.
In a recent article, Professor Mark Rothstein addressed the legal issues that bear upon
assessment of physical impairment by third-party examining physicians. The article sets forth
extensive disclosure guidelines for physicians, emphasizing, inter alia, that "except in extraordinary circumstances the physician should disclose all positive clinical findings to the ex" Rothstein, Legal Issues in the Medical Assessment of Physical Impairment by
aminee ..
Third-Party Physicians, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 503 (1984).

United States " issued a similar ruling ten years later. In Betesh, a
government physician observed an abnormality indicative of cancer
in chest X-rays taken of a young man during a military pre-induction physical examination. Although the physician made a report to

the draft board disclosing the condition, the draftee was not notified
of the abnormality. As a result, he believed the board's decision to
deny him admission to the service was due to a pre-existing knee

problem. Six months following the examination he saw a reference to
the abnormal X-ray in his medical record. After consulting his family doctor, he learned of the tumor, a form of Hodgkin's disease. By
then, it had grown six-fold in size and progressed from a highly curable stage to a terminal stage. Following the young man's death, his
wife initiated a lawsuit.
The court ruled that a physician who examines a person owes
that person a duty of good medical care with respect to all aspects of
the examination, even if no doctor-patient relationship exists."2 9 The
court noted, "When a doctor conducts a physical examination, the
examinee generally assumes that 'no news is good news' and relies on
the assumption that any serious condition will be revealed." ' The
court specifically held that the physician was obligated to warn the
examinee of any finding that would indicate the patient was in danger and should seek further medical evaluation and treatment. "This
duty is stronger when the physician has no reason to believe that the
examinee is aware of the condition and danger."' '3 The pronouncements of the Betesh court have been followed in similar federal

cases. 132
128. 400 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1974). The Betesh court found that the case fell within
the framework of Hoover because the plaintiff was compelled to appear for an examination.
Having chosen to act, the physicians in the case "were under a duty to act carefully not merely
in the conduct of the examination but also in subsequent communications to the examinee."
Id. at 246. The court also stated:
It might be suggested that Hoover is distinguishable from the present action
because in Hoover the examinee relied upon express misrepresentation of the
physician, which led him to forego treatment. The court finds reliance present in
this case also, notwithstanding the fact that it was the doctor's silence that misled the examinee.
Id.
129. Id. at 245. The court in Betesh, however, did find a doctor-patient relationship.
This relationship was created when the physicians took on the role of treating physicians, recalling the patient to see if his condition had progressed and to advise him accordingly. See
also Olson v. Western Airlines, Inc., 143 Cal. App.3d 1, 191 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1983), where, in
the context of a pre-employment physical, the court held there exists a doctor-patient relationship, at least as to any advice the doctor gives to the examinee.
130. Betesh, 400 F.Supp at 246.
131. Id. at 247. The court found two bases for liability. First, liability for the examinee's
death was based on the breach of a government regulation. This regulation required that
where an examination revealed the need for medical attention, government examining physicians were obligated to notify rejected examinees to seek advice from a doctor. The second
basis for liability was found in the common law.
132. See O'Keefe v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 79 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (soldier not
informed of tumor on pelvic bone discovered during treatment at V.A. hospital; when finally

To indicate the growth of the disclosure duty in recent years, it
is instructive to compare two Louisiana cases decided fifteen years
apart. In 1964, the Louisiana Court of Appeals decided Dowling v.
Mutual Life Insurance Co. 3 3a The plaintiff in Dowling alleged that

his physician had failed to inform him of the results of an X-ray
indicating the possibility of tuberculosis. A month later, the patient
returned for a physical examination in connection with an application for life insurance with Mutual Life Insurance Company. No Xray was taken at this time and in the information requested by the
insurance company from the physician, no mention was made of the
indication of tuberculosis. Subsequently, another doctor requested

new X-rays which indicated active tuberculosis. The patient claimed,
inter alia, that Mutual was liable for the physician's negligence in
failing to disclose the results of the initial X-ray. The plaintiff argued that since Mutual had engaged the physician to examine the

plaintiff, it was liable for the physician's failure to disclose. The
court refused to find Mutual liable for the negligence of the physi134
cian it had hired.
In 1979, the Louisiana Court of Appeals considered a similar
3 In Dornak, a precase, Dornak v. Lafayette General Hospital.""
employment physical by a hospital employer revealed a tubercular

condition in the plaintiff about which she was not informed. The
plaintiff was thereafter employed by the hospital and thus assumed
found, the tumor was out of control and the plaintiff's leg had to be amputated. Significantly,
the defendant admitted liability and proximate cause; thus the question of damages was the
primary issue in the case). See also United States v. Reid, 251 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1958) (a
pre-Betesh decision in which the government was held liable for an examining physician's failure to inform the plaintiff of an abnormal X-ray indicating a tubercular condition. The physician was found negligent for his failure to advise the plaintiff of his condition).
The failure to disclose in Betesh was the result of a bureaucratic mix-up. This was also
true in the case of James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980), in which lung
cancer observable on a pre-employment X-ray was not discovered due to a clerical error. As in
Betesh, actual knowledge of the patient's condition was not a requisite to liability. The James
court stated:
Defendant had no duty to discover James' tumor. Having made a chest X-ray an
essential part of the pre-employment examination to determine an applicant's
physical fitness, however, defendant failed to use due care when, through a clerical error, the report on the X-ray was not brought to the attention of the examining physician.
Id. at 585. Compare Lotspeich v. Chance Vought Aircraft, 369 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App.
1963). The difference in approach may indicate a broadening in the physician's duty in this
area. In Lotspeich, a pre-employment X-ray indicated that the plaintiff had tuberculosis. The
patient sued the company for failing to disclose these findings to her. The court refuaed to
answer the question whether the employer and its physician owed the plaintiff a duty to disclose known information concerning her health since the evidence established that they did not
know of her condition. At issue, therefore, was the question whether failure to discover the
tuberculosis was actionable. The Court ruled that it was not since there existed no duty to
discover the tuberculosis.
133. 168 So. 2d 107 (La. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied, 247 La. 248, 170 So.2d 508
(1965).
134. Id.
135. 368 So. 2d 1185 (La. Ct. App. 1979).

that she was healthy. Basing its decision on Dowling, the appellate
court found that the hospital employer had no duty to inform the
employee about her condition. The Lousiana Supreme Court granted
review in Dornak and reversed the lower court. 13 6 In reaching its
decision, the court focused on whether an employer owes a duty to a
prospective employee who is subsequently hired to inform him or her
of an adverse condition discovered during a required pre-employment
physical examination. The court followed the majority view and
found that although there is no duty to determine the physical fitness
of a prospective employee, once that duty is undertaken, the employer is liable if any injuries result. In this case, the employer had
taken on this responsibility and then hired the plaintiff. Accordingly,
"she was entitled to and did rely upon the expectation that she
would be told of any dangerous condition actually disclosed by that
examination .. ."18 The supreme court reversed the trial court's
dismissal of the plaintiff's suit for failure to state a cause of action
and remanded the case for trial on the merits.
The physician's obligation to disclose is thus not dependent upon
the existence of a physician-patient relationship. Where information
exists which is relevant to the physical condition of one who has been
examined, the physician has a duty to ensure its transmittal to the
examinee.
V.

Duty to Disclose Medical Negligence

One of the most difficult dilemmas confronting health professionals engaged in providing medical care and treatment arises when
a negligent act results in injury to a patient. The human reaction is
often to say nothing about the cause of the problem or, in response
to patient inquiry, to "interpret," if not consciously misrepresent, the
etiology. The courts have been inclined to look with increasing disfavor on this lack of candor. Whether there is negligence in treatment
or in allowing foreign objects, such as surgical sponges, to remain in
136. 399 So. 2d 168 (La. 1981). Cf. Thomas v. Kenton, 425 So. 2d 396 (La. Ct. App.
1983) (narrowing the applicability of the holding in Dornak to pre-employment physicals).
137. 399 So. 2d at 170. See also Teklinsky v. Ottawa Silica Corp., 583 F. Supp. 31
(E.D. Mich. 1983) (holding that a cause of action in tort would lie against an employer for
intentional concealment of an employee's medical problems, including asbestosis); JohnsManville Prod. Corp. v. Contra Costa Super. Ct., 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1980) (holding that a cause of action may exist for aggravation of the patients'
disease [asbestos related illness] because of an employer's fraudulent concealment of the condition and its cause); Delamotte v. Unitcast Division of Midland Ross Corp., 64 Ohio App.2d
159, 411 N.E.2d 814 (1978) (holding that a cause of action in fraud would lie when an employer intentionally withheld from an employee physical examination findings revealing silicosis). Cf. Henson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 564 F. Supp. 497 (D. Md. 1983) (dismissing similar claims brought under federal law but noting that the plaintiffs had filed an action in
Maryland state court on the basis of the defendant company's common law duties as well as
the duties of its physicians).

the body following an operation, the responsibility of a physician and
even a hospital's staff to ensure that a patient learns the true nature
of the problem has been the focus of numerous decisions. 38
The clear majority of precedent favors the existence of a disclos-

ure obligation that has its roots in the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship. Often, courts have articulated this disclosure duty when addressing statute of limitations questions. These
opinions focus on whether a failure to disclose operates to toll the
statute of limitations on the basis of a fraudulent concealment, or
whether a nondisclosing party will be estopped from asserting the
statute as a bar to a medical negligence cause of action. 39
138. For cases recognizing a duty to disclose medical negligence, see, e.g., Tetstone v.
Adams, 373 So. 2d 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Sutlive v. Hackney, 164 Ga. App. 740, 297
S.E.2d 515 (1983); Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951); State ex rel. Sperandio v. Clymer, 563 S.W.2d 88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Lopez v. Swyer, 115 N.J. Super. 237,
279 A.2d 116 (1971); Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 377 N.E.2d 713, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259
(1978); Garcia v. Presbyterian Hosp. Center, 92 N.M. 652, 593 P.2d 487 (1979). See also,
e.g., Nutty v. Jewish Hosp., 571 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ill. 1983) (hospital has a fiduciary duty
to reveal pertinent and material facts); Almengor v. Dade County, 359 So. 2d 892 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978) (duty to reveal facts relating to cause of patient's adverse medical condition);
Guy v. Schuldt, 236 Ind. 101, 138 N.E.2d 891 (1956) (fiduciary or confidential relationship
between physician and patient requires disclosure of material information and no active effort
to conceal is required for a cause of action); Lynch v. Rubacky, 85 N.J. 65, 424 A.2d 1169
(1981) (patient's reposing total confidence in physician mandates disclosure of medical
mistakes).
139. Cases discussing the issue of failure to disclose medical mistakes as a basis for
tolling the statute of limitations or equitable estoppel include the following: Harrison v. United
States, 708 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1983); Rodriguez v. Manoil, 9 Ariz. App. 255, 450 P.2d 737
(1969); Brown v. Bleiberg, 32 Cal. 3d 426, 651 P.2d 815, 186 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1982); Sanchez
v. Valley View Hosp. & Medical Center, 521 P.2d 1290 (Colo. App. 1974); Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1976); Stephen W. Brown Radiology Assocs. v. Gowers, 157 Ga.
App. 770, 278 S.E.2d 653 (1981); Witherell v. Weimer, 85 111.2d 146, 421 N.E.2d 869
(1981); Carrow v. Streeter, 410 N.E.2d 1369 (Ind. App. 1980); Harvey v. Davis, 432 So. 2d
1203 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Sheldon v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 102 Mich. App. 91, 300
N.W.2d 746 (1980); Brewington v. Raksakulthi, 584 S.W.2d 112 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Lynch
v. Rubacky, 85 N.J. 65, 424 A.2d 1169 (1981); Garcia v. Presbyterian Hosp. Center, 92 N.M.
652, 593 P.2d 487 (1979); Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 377 N.E.2d 713, 406 N.Y.S.2d
259 (1978); Nutt v. Carson, 340 P.2d 260 (Okla. 1959); Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907
(Tex. 1983). Cf. Smith v. Kurtzman, 106 I11.App. 3d 712, 436 N.E.2d 1 (1982) (intentional
misrepresentation subsequent to the original malpractice does not relate back to the original
malpractice for purposes of the statute of limitations); Adams v. Luros, 406 N.E.2d 1199 (Ind.
App. 1980) (when the physician-patient relationship ends, the duty to disclose and fraudulent
concealment by silence ends); but see Bowlin Horn v. Citizens Hosp., 425 So. 2d 1065 (Ala.
1983) (fraudulent concealment does not toll the statute of limitations where the legislative
intention to the contrary is clear); Stacey v. Pantano, 177 Neb. 694, 131 N.W.2d 163 (1964)
(the statute of limitations is not tolled by fraudulent concealment in the light of a contrary
legislative intention). See generally Annot., 80 A.L.R.2D 400 (1961); Vogel & Delgado, To
Tell the Truth: Physician's Duty to Disclose Medical Mistakes, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 52
(1980).
When a patient knew or should have known of the concealed information, however, the
statute of limitations will not be tolled in a fraudulent concealment case. See, e.g., Sharrow v.
Archer, 658 P.2d 1331 (Alaska 1983) (given that sufficient information was readily available
to alert a reasonable person of a potential cause of action, failure of the wrongdoer to specifically inform the patient of a negligent overdose is not sufficient to toll the statute); Rodriguez
v. Manoil, 9 Ariz. App. 225, 450 P.2d 737 (1969) (where the patient has sufficient time to
discover negligently performed surgery, the statute of limitations does not bar suit); Burton v.
Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934) (the statute of limitations is tolled until the

The judicial trend is that a physician is obligated to disclose
candidly, to the patient the true condition of his or her body as well
as the cause of the condition. Courts have been inclined to rule this
way regardless of whether the issue is framed as a statute of limitations problem or as part of a tort action sounding in fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation. This line of reasoning is based on the confidential
and fiduciary nature of the medical treatment relationship, especially
given the patient's degree of reliance upon the health care provider.
Failure to disclose may result in liability regardless of whether the
defendant is guilty of active or passive concealment and, in some
instances, even where the physician does not have actual knowledge
of the cause of the problem. 140 Further, where physicians join together in an attempt to conceal malpractice, all may be liable for
conspiracy. Damage awards in these cases include punitive as well as
compensatory damages.
A 1952 Kentucky case indicates that a duty to be candid about
medical mistakes has been contemplated by the courts for some
time. In Adams v. Ison, 41 a physician had treated a patient for
pneumonia. During the course of treatment, a six-inch rubber tube
was inserted into the patient's lung and never removed. Shortly after
the physician had inserted the tube in 1929, the patient confronted
the physician with the fact that the tube had been left in his lung.
The physician assured the patient then that the rubber would be absorbed by his body with no resulting complications. Twenty years
later the tube caused a lung hemorrhage, and the patient's lung had
to be removed.
The court held that the surgeon's alleged statement that no
harm would result was a misrepresentation upon which the patient
foreign matter is removed or the patient learned or should have learned of it); Bryson v. Aven,
32 Ga. App. 721, 124 S.E. 553 (1924) (the statute of limitations begins to run at discovery or
when the injury should have been discovered); Adams v. Luros, 406 N.E.2d 1199 (Ind. App.
1980) (when the patient learns of the malpractice or obtains information which would lead to

the discovery of the malpractice through diligence, the statute begins to run notwithstanding
concealment); Hudson v. Shoulders, 164 Tenn. 70, 45 S.W.2d 1072 (1932) (if the plaintiff
knows or neglectfully fails to discover negligence which has been concealed, the statute of
limitations is not tolled); Fitzpatrick v. Marlowe, 553 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (the
statute begins to run when an ordinarily prudent person is put upon inquiry as to the truth of
the physician's statements). See also Ray v. Wagner, 286 Minn. 354, 176 N.W.2d 101 (1970)
(it is contributory negligence when the patient gives the physician misleading information
making it difficult for the physician to locate her).
140. See Dietze v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944 (1960) (one of the grounds upon which the
suit was based was a failure of the physician to inform the plaintiff of his suspicions, not his
actual knowledge, of the presence of a surgical sponge); Guy. v. Schuldt, 236 Ind. 101, 138
N.E.2d 891 (1956) (no active effort to conceal is required); Nutt v. Carson, 340 P.2d 260
(Okla. 1959) (physician knew or should have known of the malpractice); Allison v. Blewett,
348 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (the intent of the physician is immaterial if the statement misleads or deceives). But see Carrell v. Denton, 138 Tex. 145, 157 S.W.2d 878 (1942)
(fraudulent concealment requires actual knowledge of the wrong plus a fixed purpose to
conceal).
141. 249 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).

had a right to rely. It further stated:
The relationship of a patient to his physician is by its very nature one of the most intimate. Its foundation is the theory that
the physician is learned, skilled and experienced in the afflictions
of the body about which the patient ordinarily knows little or
nothing but which are of the most vital importance to him.
Therefore, the patient must necessarily place great reliance,
faith and confidence in the professional word, advice and acts of
his doctor. It is the physicians' [sic] duty to act with the utmost
peril of being
good faith to speak fairly and truthfully at 14the
2
deceit.
and
fraud
for
damages
for
held liable
More recent cases have addressed the issue in greater detail.
Tetstone v. Adams,"" a 1979 Florida decision, concerned a patient
who underwent a total hysterectomy. Her complaint alleged that
during the course of surgery the physician negligently caused ureteral blockage and a ureterovaginal fistula through which urine began to leak. She returned to the physician the following month complaining of the problem. Although the doctor was aware of the true
cause, he advised her that "something had shown up on X-ray" and
that specialists to whom she would be referred could better explain
the condition. Several months passed before she learned that negligence during the hysterectomy operation caused the problem. The
court noted that a finding of active concealment by the physician
would constitute fraud and toll the running of the statute of limitations. The court found that the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient imposed upon the physician a duty to disclose
known facts regarding the patient's condition. " '
A similar outcome is observed in Sutlive v. Hackney. 4 5 In that
case, a physician performed reconstructive breast surgery upon a patient in which he surgically removed two previously implanted mammary prostheses and inserted two silicone-filled implants, allegedly
too small for her breast structure. Dissatisfied with the appearance
of her breasts, the patient returned to the physician who injected a
saline solution into the implants in an attempt to correct the appearance. The patient claimed that she questioned the physician about
the possibility of leakage as a result of these injections, but that he
informed her the implants would self-seal around the puncture holes
to prevent leakage.
Subsequently, due to chest pains and breast shrinkage, the patient consulted another physician and learned that the implants had
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 793-94 (emphasis added).
373 So. 2d 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
Id. at 363.
164 Ga. App. 740, 297 S.E.2d 515 (1983).

been perforated and had leaked silicone into her chest area. In order
to avoid the statute of limitations as a bar to her action, she alleged
that the physician had engaged in fraudulent conduct. The court
agreed, stating:
"Where a person sustains toward [another] a relation of trust
and confidence, his silence when he should speak, or his failure
to disclose what he ought to disclose is as much a fraud in law
as an actual affirmative false representation. . .

."

Appellee al-

leges that appellant wrongfully held himself out to be a licensed
qualified plastic surgeon and that this conduct amounts to such
a "failure to disclose" and a fraudulent misrepresentation.
Fraud is further alleged by appellee's claim that appellant failed
to disclose the possibility of puncture with resulting leakage
caused by the injections into the implants. Moreover, appellee
claims that appellant expressly assured her that no leak would
occur as a consequence of the injections due to the "self-sealing"
nature of the implants. This court recently stated that "a patient
has the right to believe what he is told by his [physician] about
his condition. . .

."

Certainly, the same right to rely on the lack

of danger of leakage obtains in this situation.
After injecting the saline solution into the apparently selfcontained silicone sacs, appellant repeated this procedure
twice-five months after the first injection and then one year
and nine months later. Even if, at the time, appellant believed
his assurance to have been true when he told appellee that the
injection would not cause leakage, his undisputed course of conduct following the first injection provides a reasonable inference
that he may have had knowledge of the leakage and acted with
the follow-up injections to conceal the problem. "Concealment
per se amounts to actual fraud where for any reason one party
has a right to expect full communication of the facts from
46
another.

1

Garcia v. PresbyterianHospital Center,"7 a 1979 case from the
Court of Appeals of New Mexico, is also instructive. In Garcia, nondisclosure of negligently induced injury prevented the running of the
statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovered the cause of the
injury. The plaintiff had undergone surgery twice in two consecutive
146. Id. at 743-44, 297 S.E.2d at 517-18 (citations omitted). A similar ruling is seen in
Nelson v. Gaunt, 125 Cal. App. 3d 623, 178 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1981), in which a physician
injected silicone into a patient's breasts, telling her that the substance injected was safe, inert,
and without side effects. He also told the patient that he could administer the substance safely,
despite his knowledge that it was unlawful for him to use silicone. Under these facts, the court
held that an action in fraud as well as malpractice could be maintained. "Under these circumstances, a physician, like any other fiduciary, is liable for his fraudulent conduct." 125 Cal.
App. 3d at 631, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 174. Cf. Wade v. Thomasville Orthopedic Clinic, Inc., 167
Ga. App. 278, 306 S.E.2d 366 (1983).
147. 92 N.M. 652, 593 P.2d 487 (Ct. App. 1979).

months for prostatic cancer. In connection with the latter surgery,
and allegedly as a result of negligence, a catheter had fallen out of
place during the patient's hospitalization, necessitating yet another
operation. The patient repeatedly asked the attending physician and
the nursing staff why a third surgical procedure was necessary.
Neither the doctor nor the nurses would answer the question. The
court reasoned that hospital patients "submit themselves to the skills
and arts, proficiency and expertise, of hospital personnel, [and] have
no real choice in the matter; they are physically and intellectually
unable to do much more than submit and rely upon the medical superiority and ethical propriety of their attendants."1 48 In reflecting
upon the existence of a constructive fraud or fraudulent concealment, the court said that once a fiduciary relationship comes into
being, "there exists a duty to speak . . . [and] mere silence constitutes fraudulent concealment."" 9 Significantly, in Garcia, the court
held the hospital liable for the nondisclosure of its employees, stating: "We have no difficulty in declaring a confidential relationship in
the standing of a hospital to it [sic] patients. Coexistent with that
relationship, therefore, is the hospital's obligation to divulge all material facts to its patients."' 50
The highest state courts of New York and New Jersey have addressed the serious and broad-reaching nature of the physician's
fiduciary obligations, particularly in the context of a charge of fraudulent concealment. In the New Jersey case of Lopez v. Swyer,' 51 a
148. Id. at 657, 593 P.2d at 490.
149. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Hardin v. Farris, 87 N.M. 143, 530 P.2d 407 (Ct.
App. 1974)).
150. Garcia, 92 N.M. at 657, 593 P.2d at 490. In Nutty v. Jewish Hosp., 571 F. Supp.
1050 (S.D. Ii. 1983), the court ruled consistently with Garcia. In Nutty, the plaintiff argued
that the defendant hospital should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations in its
defense of a medical malpractice action on the basis of certain incorrect representations made
to the plaintiff by one of the defendant's nurses. In ruling that the hospital would be estopped,
the court noted that a fiduciary is under a duty to reveal pertinent and material facts "and
that his silence when he ought to speak, or his failure to disclose what he ought to disclose, is
as much a fraud .. .as an actual affirmative false representation .. " Id. at 1052 (citing
2d 555, 402 N.E.2d 181 (1980)). The court went on
Chicago Park Dist. v. Kenroy, Inc., 78 111.
to state, "While physicians clearly have a fiduciary relationship with their patients, the relationship between a hospital and a patient is more difficult to categorize." 571 F. Supp. at 1052.
Qualifying the relationship of hospital to patient, the court opined:
Nonetheless, the Court finds that the hospital-patient relationship to be [sic]
very relevant to the question of estoppel. The superiority of knowledge of the
hospital staff, and the confidence and trust which patients must place in nurses
and interns, are all factors to be considered when determining whether plaintiff's
reliance on representations by Nurse Brennan and the other hospital personnel
was reasonable.
Id. at 1053. See also Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary & Casualty Hosp., 396 F.2d 931 (D.C.
Cir. 1967) (recognizing the duty of a hospital, based upon a fiducial relationship between
hospital and patient, to disclose a patient's medical records to his son who had initiated malpractice litigation as the result of the death of his father). Accord Cannell v. Medical &
Surgical Clinic, 21 11. App. 3d 383, 315 N.E.2d 278 (1974).
151. 115 N.J. Super. 237, 279 A.2d 116 (1971), affd, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563

patient was referred for a course of radiation therapy following a
radical mastectomy for breast cancer. She suffered severe burns in
what was described by the court as a "dramatically calamitous"
course of treatment. She was constantly plagued with pain and nausea, and developed necrotic ulcers that required reconstructive surgery. Some five years after the initial radiation therapy, the patient
learned that her condition had probably resulted from negligence on
the part of the specialist who administered the radiation therapy.
Yet, during a period of approximately four years following the original therapy, the patient on several occasions inquired of the radiologist and of her family physician regarding her condition. She received false reassurances from them, which allegedly kept her from
obtaining proper medical advice and treatment. An action was
brought against the family physician, his associates and the radiologist, separately charging negligence, fraud and conspiracy. The court
observed that there was sufficient proof to uphold the patient's fraud
claim, and held that the confidential doctor-patient relationship is so
vital that an affirmative duty to fully disclose the facts of the medical case arises and silence in the face of this duty may support an
inference of constructive misrepresentation. 5 The court further
ruled that the independent conspiracy count against the physicians
should go to the jury.
A similar fact pattern arose in the New York case of Simcuski
v. Saeli.153 There, the plaintiff initiated a malpractice action alleging
both negligence and intentional fraud against a physician who performed surgical excision of a node from her neck. Subsequently, she
experienced numbness on the right side of her face and neck as well
as difficulty and pain in raising her right arm.
Four years later, the plaintiff was advised by another physician
that the defendant had negligently injured a spinal accessory nerve
in her neck and branches of the cervical plexus. It was then too late
to correct the condition surgically. The plaintiff sued Dr. Saeli and
alleged that he willfully, falsely and fraudulently told her that her
post operative difficulties were transient and would disappear if she
would follow a regimen of physiotherapy. The court ruled that a separate cause of action for the tort of intentional fraud would lie in
addition to the negligence cause of action, and that the allegation of
fraud prevented the proffered defense of the three-year statute of
(1973).
152. 115 N.J. Super. at 246, 279 A.2d at 124. See also Estate of Leach v. Shapiro (No.
11238, Ohio App., May 2, 1984) (holding that failure to disclose material information concerning a patient's condition may be an actionable misrepresentation; moreover, the nature of
the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient may render the physician's silence
fraudulent).
153. 44 N.Y.2d 442, 377 N.E.2d 713, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1978).

limitations. 154 The court observed that successful prosecution of the
fraud action would permit recovery of an additional measure of
damages. 188

A similar approach is apparent in the Missouri decision of Sperandio v. Clymer."' Sperandio consulted two orthopedic surgeons regarding a deformed hip. The surgeons advised surgery, but did not
disclose that the proposed surgery was a modification of a pediatric
procedure which they had never performed on an adult. They then
proceeded to operate without the assent or informed consent of the
patient. During the operation, the physicians not only failed to correct the deformity, but also fractured the patient's left acetabulum
by improperly exerting excessive force. The two physicians actively
concealed this fact from the patient, falsely representing that the hip
bones had been properly moved and that the intended result of the
surgery had been achieved.
One year later, the patient sought advice from a third physician
prior to planned corrective surgery. Realizing that such surgery
would reveal the damage to the patient's hip, the third physician al154. Id. at 445, 377 N.E.2d 715, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 262. Simcuski was specifically followed in the Illinois case of Smith v. Kurtzman, 106 II!. App. 3d 712, 436 N.E.2d 1 (1982). In
Smith, the physicians allegedly had advised the plaintiff of the impossibility of a second kidney
transplant despite the fact that such a transplant could have been performed. Their advice was
an attempt to conceal their negligent treatment of a postoperative infection which resulted in
failure of the first transplant. The court decided that the patient had stated a claim for the tort
of intentional misrepresentation separate from the original tort of malpractice:
In the present case, plaintiff alleged his reliance on an affirmative, intentional
misrepresentation occurring subsequent to the malpractice which caused him to
forego a proper cure of his condition. We believe that such affirmative conduct,
if proved, sufficiently breaks the continuity of the original malpractice so as to
start the statute running anew from the date of the affirmative acts.
Id. at 715, 436 N.E.2d at 4. Cf. Renda v. Frazer, 100 Misc. 2d 511, 419 N.Y.S.2d 857 (Sup.
Ct. 1979), affd, 75 A.D.2d 490, 429 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1980). See Giancola, Equitable Estoppel
in Medical Malpractice, 14 TRIAL LAWYERS Q. 18 (1982) (discussing, inter alia, Simcuski
and Renda). See also Teklinsky v. Ottawa Silica Corp., 583 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Mich. 1983)
(citing 2A. A. Larson, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §68.32(b)(c) (1982), the court notes
that the legal validity of a cause of action for deceit by concealment of physical condition
appears to be well on its way to gaining acceptance. Id. at 35).
155. These damages would include those caused by the fraud as well as damages occasioned by the alleged malpractice. In many jurisdictions, intentional tortious conduct permits
an award of punitive damages. See Nelson v. Gaunt, 125 Cal. App. 3d 623, 178 Cal. Rptr.
167 (1981) (evidence in a lawsuit of intentional misrepresentations made in connection with an
unlawful injection of silicone into the plaintiff's breasts was sufficient to sustain jury award of
$1,500,000 in punitive damages); Dill v. Miles, 181 Kan. 350, 310 P.2d 896 (1957) (facts
alleged in the patient's petition including a failure to disclose his condition, concealment of
facts and abandonment of treatment were sufficient to constitute wanton negligence upon
which the patient could premise a cause of action for punitive damages). See also JohnsManville Prod. Corp. v. Contra Costa Super. Ct., 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1980). But see Veselenak v. Smith, 414 Mich. 567, 327 N.W.2d 261 (1982) (refusing to allow exemplary damages for injury to feelings because such damages were duplicative
of the award of ordinary damages for mental distress and anguish. Thus, where a surgical
clamp had been left inside the patient, and the physician had failed to disclose this fact to her,
she was allowed to recover $15,000 in compensatory damages, but not the $350,000 for exemplary damages awarded by the jury).
156. 563 S.W.2d 88 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).

legedly warned the medical center at which the corrective surgery

was scheduled that the patient "had litigation in mind." The medical
center cancelled plans for the corrective surgery. The patient then
brought an action for conspiracy and fraudulent concealment against
all three physicians. In addressing this claim, the court noted that
the action against the third physician was one of a conspiratorial,
intentional tort sounding in fraud, even though the fraud originated

with the first two surgeons. The court stated that in order to render a
person civilly liable for injuries resulting from a conspiracy, it is not
necessary to join the conspiracy at the time of its inception:
"'[E]very one who enters into such a common design is in law a
party to every act previously or subsequently done by any of the
others in pursuance of it. . . "157 Thus, a subsequent treating physician's failure to disclose fully a patient's true condition, coupled
with the affirmative act of preventing such discovery, legitimizes a
cause of action not only in fraud but also potentially in conspiracy. 158
It is interesting to note that not only has the law taken a dim
view of the coverup of medical negligence, but such a coverup may
also serve as the basis for a successful action by a tortiously injured
third party. In Banyas v. Lower Bucks Hospital,159 the plaintiff had
become involved in an altercation with one Thomas Lavin, who consequently required medical care for a fractured jaw. During surgical
reduction of the fracture, Lavin died as a result of medical negligence. Lavin's medical records did not reflect this negligence, but
rather indicated that he died solely from the injuries received in the
altercation. The plaintiff was thereafter charged with numerous

crimes, including murder, as the result of Lavin's death. Banyas subsequently sued the hospital and its personnel for negligent and inten157. Id. at 91 (quoting 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy §19, at 659 (1967)).
158. See Oppenheim & Youmans, Deadly Omission: When Must the Doctor Talk, LEGAL Asp. MED. PRAC., Oct. 1981, at 1,in which the authors discuss the disclosure obligations
of the subsequent treating physician. Cf. Hart v. Browne, 103 Cal. App. 3d 947, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 356 (1980). In Hart, the plaintiff contacted Dr. Browne, a consulting physician, to determine whether treatment provided to the plaintiff by a prior treating physician, Dr. Nork, fell
below the standard of care. Knowing that the plaintiff would rely on the opinion given in
deciding whether to proceed with an action against Dr. Nork, Dr. Browne explained that based
on his review of the claim there was no malpractice. Accordingly, the plaintiff filed no action.
Subsequently, the plaintiff learned that a number of cases were pending against Dr. Nork and
endeavored to bring suit against him. The claim was barred by the statute of limitations and
the plaintiff then filed an action against Dr. Browne alleging fraud and negligence with respect
to Dr. Browne's statements that the care provided by Dr. Nork was reasonable. At trial, the
plaintiff produced three experts who, after reviewing the same materials examined by Dr.
Browne, concluded that the care rendered to the plaintiff by Dr. Nork was far below the
standard of care. After considering the general elements of a cause of action for fraudulent
misrepresentation (false representation, concealment or nondisclosure; knowledge of falsity; intent to induce reliance; justifiable reliance; and resulting damage) the court ruled that the
decision of the lower court to nonsuit the plaintiff's cause of action for fraud without permitting the jury to consider the available evidence was erroneous.
159. 293 Pa. Super. 122, 437 A.2d 1236 (1981).

tional infliction of emotional distress suffered as a result of having
been charged with the above-mentioned crimes. The trial court sustained preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court affirmed the order dismissing the negligence counts but reversed the order dismissing the
count alleging intentional infliction of mental distress. The court
stated that an intentionally propagated misstatement of the cause of
Lavin's death was "intolerable professional conduct and extreme and
outrageous" and that Banyas "was substantially certain to suffer
emotional distress following such a report."1 0 Therefore, the facts
alleged, if proven, would entitle him to relief.
As the preceding cases illustrate, the courts have carved out a
duty incumbent on health care providers to disclose medical negligence to patients. This duty requires full and frank disclosure in response to patient inquiry and appears to require similar disclosure
even where the patient fails to make specific inquiry. Since mere silence in this context has been found tantamount to affirmative concealment, it is questionable whether passivity will provide a defense
in those judicial forums where active misrepresentation is deemed
tortious.
The scope of this disclosure duty has yet to be fully delineated,
particularly with respect to subsequent treating or examining physicians who are aware of malpractice by a prior treating physician.""
Certainly, there is a readily observed judicial orientation toward precluding those persons accused of misrepresentation or fraudulent
concealment from asserting the statute of limitations as a bar to litigation. There is also a marked judicial trend toward predicating separate tort liability upon specific acts of concealment or coverup, regardless of whether the concealment was affirmative or passive.
It is difficult to predict how widely accepted the notion of sepa160. Id. at 126, 437 A.2d at 1239.
161. See Vogel & Delgado, supra note 139. The authors suggest a solution for the "wall
of silence" problem, i.e., physicians refusing to disclose the malpractice of their colleagues to
patients. They encourage judicial creation of an affirmative duty to disclose medical mistakes
on the part of colleagues in an effort to police this type of nondisclosure, maintaining that selfregulation of the profession does not work. The authors indicated that in 1980 there was no
such duty, claiming that the courts had only tolled the statutes of limitations in such cases,
enabling the patient to bring a present cause of action. The authors did observe, however, that
some courts had "recognized an obligation on the part of the primary physician to disclose the
injury to the patient.. . . Failure to inform is viewed either as a breach of the doctor's duty of
due care . . . and thus as part of the original malpractice, or as misrepresentation by silence.
. ."Id. at. 68. Referring to the Vogel and Delgado article, Dr. Charles M. Culver makes the
questionable observation that there is no moral, legal, or ethical duty on the part of the subsequent treating physician to disclose the negligence of a colleague. Warner, Telling Patients
About Medical Negligence, 129 CAN. MED. A.J. 366 (1983). See also Graham, Bad
Medicine-States Move to Catch Incompetent Doctors, but Progress Is Uneven, Wall Street
J., May 1, 1981, at 1, col. 1; Oppenheim & Youmans, Deadly Omission When Must the
Doctor Talk? LEGAL ASP. MED. PRAC., Oct. 1981, at 1.

rate tort .liability for failure to disclose medical negligence will become. Given the increasing emphasis being placed upon the fiduciary
nature of the physician-patient relationship, it seems that increased
physician candor with respect to disclosing medical negligence is
mandated when the cause of a patient's illness or injury is medical
treatment that has fallen below the standard of care.'
VI. Limitations on the Duty to Disclose
A review of the common law as well as pertinent statutory law
offers some guidance to existing limits on the disclosure duty. It appears that under certain circumstances, a physician may consider
what the impact of disclosure will be upon a patient in determining
the scope and extent of information disclosed. The obvious concern
of the law is for the welfare of the patient, and courts have recognized the legitimacy of this limiting factor in the context of information disclosures.
An oft-quoted statement from Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary
and Casualty Hospital68 acknowledges consideration of limitations
on disclosure: "We find in the fiducial qualities of [the physicianpatient] relationship the physician's duty to reveal to the patient that
which in his best interests it is important that he should know."'" It
seems, however, that this qualifying observation is offered by the
courts either with little pertinent elaboration or in conjunction with
language that nevertheless goes on to encourage maximum disclosure.'8 5 It does appear, however, on review of the various approaches
162. One of the primary reasons that physicians refrain from disclosing error or negligence in treatment is concern over being sued for malpractice. Yet, in many situations it is
reasonable to anticipate that a candid and sincere discussion of the cause of the patient's
injury coupled with active efforts to remedy the problem and provide continuing supportive
care will mitigate the likelihood of subsequent malpractice litigation. See D.J. FLASTER, MALPRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL RIGrs OF PATIENTS AND DOCTORS (1983). Dr. Flaster,
also an attorney, emphasizes the importance of candor in communication as a method for
avoiding malpractice claims. He observes that "failure to communicate with the patient, or
failure to inform the patient, is frequently the foundation upon which future dissatisfaction
and lawsuits are built." Id. at 36. See also Hall, Doctor-PatientRapport: Key to Avoiding a
Malpractice Suit, 23 PHYSICIAN'S MANAGEMENT 120 (1983). The Rhode Island Supreme
Court in Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972), aptly stated, "'more communication' between doctor and patient means 'less litigation' between patient and doctor."
295 A.2d at 690.
163. 396 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
164. Id. at 935 (emphasis added). See also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Cannell v. Medical & Surgical Clinic, 21 11. App. 3d 383, 315 N.E.2d 278,
280 (1974); Peralta v. Martinez, 90 N.M. 391, 564 P.2d 194, 203 (Ct. App. 1977); Phillips v.
Good Samaritan Hosp., 65 Ohio App. 2d 112, 416 N.E.2d 646, 648 (1979); Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 n.18 (Utah 1980).
165. In Peralta v. Martinez, 90 N.M. 391, 564 P.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1977), the applicable
language reads as follows:
[The physician] must reveal to the patient that which, in his best interests, it is
important that he should know. . . . This includes a full and fair disclosure of
all facts which materially affect the patient's rights and interests. A patient has
a right to know the cause of his disability. Withholding information, in a sense,

taken by numerous courts that a reasonably identifiable boundary
exists beyond which disclosure is not required. For example, some
courts have observed that the physician is not obligated to disclose
"guesses," "conjecture," "speculation" or "mere possibilities."'16
Other courts have suggested that the physician may not be required
to tell "everything," noting that in certain circumstances unmitigated disclosure may even constitute bad medical practice."" 7
Another judicial limitation of the disclosure obligation is found
in the therapeutic privilege doctrine. This doctrine recognizes the existence of a certain degree of discretion on the part of the physician
in disclosing information to the patient in the context of obtaining
informed consent. 1 8 The privilege "excuses the withholding of information where disclosure would be unhealthful to the patient," 169 as
when "the information would complicate or hinder treatment, cause
such emotional distress as to preclude a rational decision, or cause
psychological harm to the patient." ' In several states, this doctrine
has been codified as part of informed consent legislation. For example, New York law provides for use of the therapeutic privilege as a
defense to any action for medical malpractice based upon alleged
amounts to a misrepresentation.
id. at 403, 564, P.2d at 203 (citations omitted).
166. Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1976) (silence regarding a possible condition or cause reasonably nonverifiable does not equal fraudulent concealment of facts); Tetstone v. Adams, 373 So. 2d 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (there is no requirement that the
physician disclose "mere possibilities or conjecture"), Almengor v. Dade County, 359 So. 2d
892, 894 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (a physician is under a duty to "reveal to the [patient]
facts as [distinguished from mere possibilities or conjecture] known to, or available to a physician by efficient diagnosis, relating to the nature and/or cause of the [patient's] adverse physical condition").
167. Sinkey v. Surgical Assocs., 186 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Iowa 1971), citing Williams v.
Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292 (1963).
168. A.J. ROSOFF, supra note 7, at 54-56; Meisel, The "Exceptions" to Informed Consent, 45 CONN. MED. 27 (1981) (Part 1); 45 CONN. MED. 107 (1981) (Part 2); see also
Veatch, When Should the Patient Know?, 8 BARRISTER 3, 8 (1981) (tracing the origins of the
therapeutic privilege to an article by Dr. Hubert Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold
Specific Diagnosisfrom Patient Sick with Serious or Fatal Illness, 19 TENN. L. REV. 349

(1945-47)).
169. Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 700 (Minn. 1977). See also Carman v.
Dippold, 63 I11.App. 3d 419, 379 N.E.2d 1365 (1978) (given that the patient had signed a
consent form and that she was already in an excited condition, the physician was not negligent
in failing to inform her of the breech position of her baby); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393,
407, 350 P.2d 1093, 1103 (1960) (a physician is not required to tell all possible consequences
of treatment; complete disclosure itself arguably could constitute bad medical practice because
it alarms the patient. "There is probably a privilege, on therapeutic grounds, to withhold the
specific diagnosis where the disclosure of cancer or some other dread disease would seriously
jeopardize the recovery of an unstable, temperamental or severely depressed patient.");
Tramutola v. Bortone, 63 N.J. 9, 304 A.2d 197 (1973) (in postoperative treatment, the physician should have told the patient that a suturing needle had broken off and a part remained in
the patient's chest "absent any sound medical reason for not doing so"); Lopez v. Swyer, 115
N.J. Super. 237, 247, 279 A.2d 116, 124 (1971) ("By reason of medical considerations related
to the welfare of the patient (for instance, the recurrent problem of whether cancer patients
should be 'told'), caution should be exercised in the application of [a duty to disclose] consistent with fairness to the physician in the exercise of his best judgment.").
170. Cornfeldt, 262 N.W.2d at 700.

failure to obtain informed consent.17 1
The therapeutic privilege doctrine, however, is predominantly
seen in the context of informed consent litigation and offers only
analogous application with respect to the more broad-based disclosure responsibilities described in this article. Of greater probable consequence is the limited viability given to the doctrine by those courts
that discuss it in reasonable detail. An excellent example of such a
restrictive approach is the landmark decision of Canterbury v.
Spence.172 The Canterbury court cautioned that the therapeutic privilege should be "carefully circumscribed," lest it "devour the disclosure rule itself. The privilege does not accept the paternalistic notion
that the physician may remain silent simply because divulgence
might prompt the patient to forego therapy the physician feels the
patient really needs. 1 7 8
Commentators have also urged a degree of caution in placing
undue reliance upon the privilege as a defense to nondisclosure. One
commentator observes:
A physician would be well advised not to rely upon a defense of
therapeutic privilege unless it is well documented that the patient's sensitivity was significantly above the norm. It is too easy
to claim, after the fact, that the patient was distraught; such
claims will be closely scrutinized. To document a patient's high
susceptibility to anxiety, confirmation of the doctor's observation
by another medical person and/or a relative or close friend of
the patient should be sought and entered on the patient's treatment record.""
17 1. The statute provides:
[T]he medical practitioner, after considering all of the attendant facts and circumstances, used reasonable discretion as to the manner and extent to which
. . .alternatives or risks were disclosed to the patient because he reasonably
believed that the manner and extent of such disclosure could reasonably be expected to adversely and substantially affect the patient's condition.
N.Y. PUBL. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (Consol. 1976). For similar provisions, see ALASKA STAT.

§09.55.556(b)(4) (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. §34-2614(B)(2)(d) (1983); 18 DEL. CODE ANN.
§6852(b)(3) (1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §507-C:3.II(b)(4) (1983); ORE. REV. STAT.
§677.097(2) (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. §1301.103 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §78-14-5(2)(d)
(1977); 12 VT. STAT. ANN. §1909 (1983); WIs. STAT. ANN. §448.30 (1983).
172. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
173. Id. at 789. "Social Policy does not accept the paternalistic view that the physician
may remain silent because divulgence might prompt the patient to forego needed therapy."
Current Ops. of the Judicial Council of A.M.A., No. 8.07, 1984, at 30.
174. A.J. ROSOFF, supra note 7, at 55. Another author suggests that in addition to careful documentation, the physician obtain a consultation with respect to the legitimacy of exercise of the therapeutic privilege. Hinkle, Informed Consent and the Family Physician, 12 J.
FAM. PRAC. 109 (1981). In his article on placebo therapy, Professor Kapp suggests that full
disclosure simply become the standard:
The most complete, and hence most conservative, standard for informed consent
is full disclosure: all known significant information concerning the proposed
treatment is required to be communicated to the patient. Although no jurisdiction has yet adopted this standard, full disclosure, coupled with sufficient documentation, is the best defense a physician could have against a claim of lack of

The suggestion that a physician undertake extensive documentation of the legitimacy of an exercise of the therapeutic privilege carries with it clear and significant implications. Specifically, when a
patient takes legal action against a physician on the basis of nondisclosure or insufficient disclosure of information, the burden will be
placed squarely upon the defendant physician to convincingly
demonstrate the therapeutic basis upon which the decision not to disclose was predicated.175 This approach reflects heightened regard on
the part of the judiciary for a patient's important rights of autonomy
and self-determination.
The value of the therapeutic privilege as a defense to nondisclosure in the context of informed consent cases is debatable. The privilege may provide some flexibility to a physician deciding the limits of
information disclosure in order to obtain informed consent. To the
extent that it provides flexibility, it is reasonable to apply the doctrine by analogy to the types of disclosure responsibilities which are
the focus of this article. Thus, if complete disclosure of information
to a patient could pose such a threat of detriment or harm to the
patient as to become infeasible or clearly contraindicated, the physician's well-supported and documented election to forego complete
disclosure will be entitled to respect.
informed consent. Under this standard, the patient should at least be unambiguously told that the physician is considering prescribing a specific treatment primarily for its expected placebo effect. No higher standard than full disclosure
can be expected of a physician.
Kapp, Placebo Therapy and the Law: Prescribe With Care, 8 AM. J. L. & MED. 371, 393
(1983). Professor Robertson observes that "[i]n a rare instance, if the shock of the knowledge
itself would injure the patient or render him incompetent, a therapeutic privilege to withhold
information might be found." ROBERTSON, supra note 96, at 7. Similarly, Professor Somerville
emphasizes that "the privilege should apply when a reasonable physician in the same circumstances would anticipate that the disclosure of information normally required to be given
would, on the balance of probabilities, in itself, physically or mentally harm the patient in a
serious way and to a significant degree." Somerville, Therapeutic Privilege: Variation on the
Theme of Informed Consent, 12 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 4 (Feb. 1984). See also Angoff,
Case Study: Disclosure of the Hidden Injury, I.R.B., Nov. 1982 at 6. The Angoff article
addresses a research-related adverse event reported to an Institutional Review Board. A coronary sinus catheter had been placed in the right side of the research subject's heart with the
subject's full consent. Subsequently, physicians discovered that the procedure had caused a
small perforation of the anterior wall of the right ventricle. The physicians involved decided
not to tell the patient about this mishap. In reviewing this decision, the I.R.B. decided that the
patient should have been told, carving out an exception as follows: "if in the cardiologist's
judgment to be so informed would be detrimental to the subject's health interests, the information could be withheld, but this fact should be documented for the medical record and for the
IRB." Id. at 7. See also Sieber, Deception in Social Research I: Kinds of Deception and the
Wrongs They May Involve, I.R.B., Nov. 1982, at 1 (the article examines several types of
deception research and the potential of each for wronging or harming persons).
175. Professor Kapp points out that "while some physicians insist that they might be
held liable for telling the patient too much, no court has ever found a physician liable for
giving a patient an excessive amount of accurate and relevant information." Kapp, supra note
174, at 398. Another commentator observes, "There would seem to be no support for the
assumption that it is to the benefit of the patient to withhold certain kinds of information
under certain circumstances according to the doctor's judgment." Andrews, supra note 6, at
168 n.25.

Another source of potential limitation on the physician's disclosure responsibilities also derives from the informed consent milieu.
Competing standards have evolved with respect to the scope of information that must be disclosed regarding the nature of a proposed
treatment or procedure, the risks involved, available alternatives, if
any, and the benefits reasonably anticipated. The various jurisdictions that have addressed this issue at common law are almost evenly
divided, ruling that the extent of information to be disclosed by a
physician should be governed by either the prevailing standard of
professional practice as established through expert testimony or by
the patient's need for information." 6 The former standard focuses
upon the conduct of the reasonable medical practitionerwhich similarly forms the basis for measuring breach of duty in medical malpractice cases. The latter standard focuses upon whether the physician's disclosure to the patient was sufficient1 to permit the
reasonablepatient to make an informed decision. 7
While it is not entirely clear, the professional disclosure standard appears to be supported by the greater weight of common law
authority in the informed consent context and is representative of the
legislative trend in those states enacting informed consent legislation. 17 8 Accordingly, it might be argued that in a majority of jurisdictions analogous application of the expert testimony rule would
serve as a basis for limiting the physician's disclosure responsibilities
in situations other than those involving simply informed consent.
Thus, the scope of disclosure in situations ranging from disclosure of
terminal illness to apprisal of negligently induced injury would presumably be governed by what the reasonable medical practitioner
would disclose in a similar situation under similar circumstances.
Because the issue of informed consent in medical treatment
tends to incorporate, if not wholly derive from, professional medical
considerations, it would not be unreasonable for disclosure responsibilities to be established through appropriate expert testimony. However, when the fundamental nature and cause of a patient's illness or
injury is at issue, it seems more realistic to anticipate that standards
of ordinary reasonableness will govern.
For example, in Bloskas v. Murray, 79 the Colorado Supreme
Court recognized negligent misrepresentation as a theory of recovery
separate from informed consent or medical malpractice. The defendant physician had suggested that the patient's fractured ankle be
176. LeBlang, Informed Consent-Duty and Causation: A Survey of Current Developments, XVIII FORUM 280, 281 (1983).
177. Id. at 282-83. See also A.J. RosoFF, supra note 7, at 34-41.
178. LeBlang, supra note 176, at 282.
179. 646 P.2d 907 (Colo. 1982).

totally replaced with an artificial one and the patient consented. Due
to subsequent complications, however, his leg had to be amputated
below the knee. In his suit, the patient alleged that the physician had
falsely indicated that he had performed ankle replacements before
and also failed to inform the plaintiff of a risk of amputation. The
court found that these allegations stated a cause of action sounding
in negligent misrepresentation.
The court stated that the tort of negligent misrepresentation
provides a remedy for false information negligently given to a person
who relies to his or her detriment thereon and cited Section 311 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts as authority. Despite the fact
that Colorado required expert testimony to establish a breach of
duty with respect to an informed consent action, the court chose to
apply ordinary negligence principles where the disclosure of information by the physician fell outside of the informed consent context.
The court stated:
A patient often has little choice but to rely upon the representations and assurances of his physician in matters of personal
medical concern. That a physician may have complied with professional community standards of disclosure for a particular procedure is not to say that the physician should not be liable for
negligently misrepresenting facts which are extrinsic to his duty
to warn but which nonetheless influence the patient's decision
about treatment. Nor does it follow that merely because a physician may apply the degree of knowledge, skill and care as is
used by other physicians practicing the same specialty, the physician thereby has discharged his full responsibility to the patient. In short, we know of no reason to deny relief when a physician negligently conveys false information to the patient, and
the patient relies upon the information to his physical harm. 8 '
In light of the decision in Bloskas, it seems that even in jurisdictions
that currently recognize the professional disclosure standard in informed consent cases, there may be a tendency to create an exception to this rule in situations involving nondisclosure of injury or illness where consent to a particular medical procedure is not the
primary focus. 8 1
180. Id. at 914-15.
181. Such an exception would also be consistent with the judicially recognized "common
knowledge" exception to the expert testimony requirement in medical malpractice cases. C.
KRAMER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE,

para. 29.01 [3] (1983) (in those situations in which a physi-

cian's conduct is grossly negligent or treatment is of such a nature that the common knowledge
of lay persons is sufficient to recognize negligence, a majority of jurisdictions do away with the

expert testimony requirement); see also S.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE §11:2 (1981).
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In one pertinent case, Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980), a physician failed to
disclose that following surgery a needle remained inside the patient at the site of the operation.

It is not unreasonable to anticipate that in certain jurisdictions
and under certain circumstances the physician's obligation to disclose information regarding injury or illness will be premised upon a
standard articulated by the profession. It is highly doubtful, however, that any such trend will be as pronounced as is currently the
case in informed consent litigation. 8 "
In summarizing the existence and availability of limitations on a
physician's duty to disclose injury and illness, there does appear to
be an identifiable set of qualifying considerations that may legitimize
nondisclosure under particularly appropriate circumstances. These
limitations, however, lie at the periphery of an otherwise comprehensive duty. Moreover, a physician who elects to rely on these limitations will bear the burden of demonstrating the legitimacy of that
position in any litigation premised upon breach of fiduciary duty.
VII.

Conclusion

In recent years, there has been a growing emphasis upon patient
autonomy and self-determination in the context of the physician patient relationship. With that has come a trend in the law toward
increasing protection of patients' trust in medical practitioners. Information communicated by physicians must be complete, accurate
and fully reliable, while information withheld must fall within narrowly prescribed categories.
A thorough review of common law and statutes, as well as pertinent commentary, indicates that during the coming decade courts
and legislatures will pay increasing homage to the physician's fiduciary responsibility to fully disclose to patients information about the
condition of their bodies, even if the condition may be the result of
the physician's own negligence. Failure to adhere to this duty will
result in the prosecution of legitimate legal actions sounding not only
in negligence but also in fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and conspiracy. Physicians are therefore best advised to be thorough and
complete in communications with patients, ensuring full disclosure of
In dispensing with an expert testimony requirement with respect to establishing a breach of
the duty on the part of the physician, the court said, "Where the physician fails to disclose to
his patient any information concerning a material fact, there is no question of skill and judgment, no question of practice beyond the knowledge of laymen which must be established
through expert testimony." Id. at 355.
182. The judiciary has been inclined to find that reasonable prudence may require a
standard of care higher than that experienced by the relevant professional group. Gates v.
Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 926 (1979); Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d
981 (1974). See also T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). The following language from
the opinion in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972), is illustrative: "Respect for the patient's right of self-determination on particular therapy demands a standard set
by law for physicians rather than one which physicians may or may not impose upon
themselves."

all pertinent facts and describing the nature, extent and cause of
patient illness and injury."" 3
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